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A CRIMINAL PROCEDURE REGIME
BASED ON INSTRUMENTAL VALUES
ABOUT GUILT AND INNOCENCE: THE ORIGINS,
DEVELOPMENT, AND FUTURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE. By Donald A. Dripps.1 Praeger
Publishers. 2003. xix + 295 pp. $85.95.
Tracey Maclin

2

INTRODUCTION
To listen to those who teach and study American constitutional criminal procedure, the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in
this field is a mess. Scholars from different political perspectives
share the view that the Court’s criminal procedure rulings are often inconsistent, out of touch with the real world of law enforcement needs, and unduly protect the rights of guilty defendants without enhancing the freedom and liberty of innocent
3
persons. This complaint is not confined to law professors who
1. Professor of Law, University of San Diego School of Law.
2. Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law.
3. For critical commentary on the state of Fourth Amendment law, see, e.g., Akhil
Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 757–58 (1994)
(“The Fourth Amendment today is an embarrassment. Much of what the Supreme Court
has said in the last half century—that the Amendment generally calls for warrants and
probable cause for all searches and seizures, and exclusion of illegally obtained evidence—is initially plausible but ultimately misguided. . . . Meanwhile, sensible rules that
the Amendment clearly does lay down or presuppose . . . are ignored by the Justices. . . .
Criminals go free, while honest citizens are intruded upon in outrageous ways with little
or no real remedy. If there are good reasons for these and countless other odd results, the
Court has not provided them.”); Craig M. Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1468, 1468 (1985) (“The fourth amendment is the Supreme
Court’s tarbaby: a mass of contradictions and obscurities that has ensnared the ‘Brethren’ in such a way that every effort to extract themselves only finds them more profoundly stuck.”); Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives On The Fourth Amendment, 58
MINN. L. REV. 349, 349 (1974) (“For clarity and consistency, the law of the fourth
amendment is not the Supreme Court’s most successful product.”). For critical comments
on the Court’s Self-Incrimination Clause and police interrogation cases, see, e.g., Akhil
Reed Amar & Renee B. Lettow, Fifth Amendment First Principles: The SelfIncrimination Clause, 93 MICH. L. REV. 857, 858 (1995) (arguing that “courts and com-
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are unburdened by the responsibility of deciding cases and writing opinions that are consistent with precedents that are decades
old. Justice Scalia, a member of the Court for almost twenty
years, has on more than a few occasions (usually in dissenting or
concurring opinions) criticized his colleagues for issuing rulings
that contradict earlier cases, or are devoid of principled reason4
ing and common sense.
Professor Donald Dripps shares the view that the law of
criminal procedure “is in disarray” and “highly dysfunctional”
5
(p. xiii). Dripps believes that the Supreme Court’s “legal docmentators have been unable to deduce what the privilege is for, [and] they have failed to
define its scope in the most logical and sensible way.”); William J. Stuntz, Miranda’s Mistake, 99 MICH. L. REV. 975, 976 (2001) (“As things stand now, from almost any plausible
set of premises, police interrogation is badly regulated. Because of Dickerson [v. United
States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000)], it will continue to be badly regulated for a long time to
come.”); Charles D. Weisselberg, Saving Miranda, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 109, 188 (1998)
(arguing that under the modern Court’s interpretation, “Miranda no longer will safeguard Fifth Amendment values, prevent coercive interrogations, or assist courts in avoiding more difficult determinations of voluntariness”).
4. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 444–45 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (complaining that “Justices whose votes are needed to compose [the Dickerson] majority are on record as believing that a violation of Miranda is not a violation of the Constitution. And so, to justify today’s agreed-upon result, the Court must adopt a significant
new, if not entirely comprehensible, principle of constitutional law. As the Court chooses
to describe that principle, statutes of Congress can be discarded, not only when what they
prescribe violates the Constitution, but when what they prescribe contradicts a decision
of this Court that ‘announces a constitutional rule.’”) (citations omitted); California v.
Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 583 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“I do not regard today’s holding as some momentous departure, but rather as merely the continuation of an inconsistent jurisprudence that has been with us for years.”); County of Riverside v. McLaughlin,
500 U.S. 44, 71 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“One hears the complaint, nowadays, that
the Fourth Amendment has become constitutional law for the guilty; that it benefits the
career criminal (through the exclusionary rule) often and directly, but the ordinary citizen remotely if at all. By failing to protect the innocent arrestee, today’s opinion reinforces that view. . . . In my view, this is the image of a system of justice that has lost its
ancient sense of priority, a system that few Americans would recognize as our own.”).
5. Dripps proffers three statistics to illustrate the practical failures in the criminal
justice system: First, “half of all arrests don’t lead to convictions.” This fact, according to
Dripps, must mean that “the police detect many guilty offenders the courts fail to convict, that the police arrest a great many innocent people, or that arrest is routinely used
as a kind of informal punishment.” Dripps believes that “some combination of these
phenomena explains the nonconviction rate” (p. xiii).
Second, “25% of the conclusive DNA tests performed at the request of the police
exonerate the suspect.” This obviously means that a significant number of innocent people have been ensnarled in the criminal justice system. Dripps plausibly theorizes that the
factors that implicate innocent persons in cases where DNA test can be performed—
“misidentification, poor defense work, prosecutorial misconduct, informant perjury, and
false confessions—are at work in other cases too.” The upshot is that the criminal adjudicatory process “is being asked to negate far more false accusations than criminal justice
professions previously believed” (id.).
Finally, “[a]lthough social science data suggest that black and white usage rates of
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trine is in large measure responsible for the failure of the criminal-procedure revolution,” and contends that “current doctrine
does not reflect prevailing (and justified) values about the criminal process” (p. xiv). To prove his claim, Dripps has written a
book that expertly identifies the flaws, inconsistencies and missteps of the Court’s constitutional criminal procedure cases dating back to the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment. About
Guilt and Innocence: The Origins, Development, and Future of
Constitutional Criminal Procedure is a comprehensive and
thoughtful critique of the Court’s criminal procedure jurisprudence. While Dripps surveys the entire field of constitutional
criminal procedure, the book pays close attention to the Court’s
Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Amendment cases. Topics such as search
and seizure, the exclusionary rule, police interrogation and the
right to counsel receive scrupulous analysis by Dripps.
This book is not casual or beach reading. Dripps’ legal
analysis is meticulously researched. Parts of the book discuss
constitutional law cases and theories that are rarely taught (or
even mentioned) in a standard criminal procedure course. A
firm knowledge of constitutional law is essential to understand
6
many of Dripps’ arguments. Although the book is intellectually
rigorous, it is not a book that should be confined to the bookshelves of law professors. The Justices of the Supreme Court
should read this book. The issues discussed by Dripps are addressed by judges—both federal and state—on a regular basis.
Moreover, the impact and meaning of many of the rulings dis7
8
cussed in the book—Terry v. Ohio, Miranda v. Arizona and
9
Strickland v. Washington —remain highly controversial among
marijuana and cocaine are roughly comparable, blacks are five times more likely than
whites to be convicted of these offenses. Police decisions to stop, search and arrest, and
prosecutorial decisions to charge, clearly have a massively disproportionate impact on
black Americans” (p. xiv). For two thoughtful views on the role of race in the criminal
process and the inequalities inherent in the criminal justice system, see RANDALL
KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW (1997) and MICHAEL TONRY, MALIGN
NEGLECT: RACE, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA (1995).
6. The only frustrating part of the book was the endnotes. Professor George Thomas is right about the use of endnotes, particularly in a book like this one, where the
endnotes often contain a large amount of useful information. See George C. Thomas III,
An Assault on the Temple of Miranda, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 807, 808 n.4
(1995) (“Is it not late in the day for endnotes? Having become accustomed to footnotes
in this computer age, the endnotes were quite frustrating, all the more so because readers
will want to examine [the author’s] notes carefully.”). Of course, Professor Thomas’ own
book on Double Jeopardy, a fine piece of legal scholarship, also has endnotes. See
GEORGE C. THOMAS, DOUBLE JEOPARDY: THE HISTORY, THE LAW (1998).
7. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
8. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
9. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
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the judiciary and its observers. When addressing these controversies, Dripps offers a fair and balanced presentation of the opposing legal and policy choices confronting the Court. To be
sure, Dripps has specific (and pointed) opinions about the
Court’s jurisprudence. But he does not let his own views stand in
the way of educating his readers.
My review will proceed as follows. Part I provides a general
overview of Dripps’ book. Dripps discusses so many cases and
topics that a fair and detailed review of the book’s various aspects and premises would go beyond the scope of this project.
Therefore, Part I simply highlights Dripps’ core arguments.
Part II, in contrast, is a detailed discussion of Dripps’ analysis of
the Court’s confession cases. This part also includes a description
of Dripps’ proposal to regulate police interrogation and my critique of his proposal.
PART I: THE BOOK ITSELF
A. THE ORIGINS OF CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:
THE FIRST BIG MISTAKE AND REJECTION OF INCORPORATION
THEORY
About Guilt and Innocence discusses a wide range of criminal procedure issues and several hundred judicial decisions. Although Dripps directs most of his analysis on the Court’s Fourth,
Fifth and Sixth Amendment rulings, this focus is dictated as
much by the Court as it is by Dripps himself. Fourth, Fifth and
Sixth Amendment cases remain a staple of the Court’s docket
and these are the cases taught in the standard criminal procedure
10
course in American law schools.
10. Each Term, the Court decides a number of interesting cases involving criminal
procedure issues. In recent years, the Court has decided several important constitutional
issues in criminal cases. See, e.g., United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005) (federal
sentencing guidelines are subject to the jury trial requirements of the Sixth Amendment);
Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004) (mandatory state sentencing guidelines system violated the Sixth Amendment jury trial requirements); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S.
551 (2005) (execution of individuals under 18 years of age at the time of their capital
crimes prohibited by the Eighth Amendment); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002)
(executions of mentally retarded defendants prohibited by the Eighth Amendment). The
Court has also addressed the President’s authority to detain an American citizen as an
“enemy combatant.” See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (explaining that although Congress authorized the President to detain enemy combatants in the narrow
circumstances of this case, due process principles require that a citizen held as an enemy
combatant be given a meaningful opportunity to challenge the factual basis of his detention before a neutral decisionmaker). Readers of Dripps’ book will not find a discussion
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The book is organized in seven chapters. The first chapter is
entitled “Constitutional Criminal Procedure from the Adoption
of the Fourteenth Amendment to 1947: The Strange Career of
Fundamental Fairness.” As the title indicates, this chapter introduces the reader to the Court’s initial venture into constitutional
criminal procedure in the wake of the Civil War and the Reconstruction Amendments. In 1884, in Hurtado v. California, the
Court adopted a fundamental fairness test to determine whether
state criminal procedures satisfied the demands of the Four11
teenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. The specific issue in
Hurtado was whether due process required a grand jury indictment to initiate a state murder criminal charge, as is required by
the Fifth Amendment’s Grand Jury Clause in federal prosecutions. The Hurtado Court held that an ex parte information satisfied due process requirements. Due process, according to Hurtado, only required those “fundamental principles of liberty and
12
justice which lie at the base of all our civil political institutions.”
And due process emphasizes the “substance” of fundamental
rules of law, rather than the “forms and modes of attainment”
13
dictated by the law.
Dripps asserts that Hurtado’s embrace of substantive due
process was a momentous mistake. He contends that an “instrumental theory of procedural due process offers the most appropriate doctrinal premise for constitutional criminal procedure”
(p. 3). While arguing that substantive due process was the wrong
tool to use in order to judge the constitutional validity of state
criminal procedures, Dripps explains that a substantive due
process model did not pose practical obstacles to state police investigations or trial procedures. “Quite the contrary, until 1923,
the Court did not reverse a state criminal conviction because of a
due process violation” (p. 15). As Dripps recognizes, the Court’s
consistent refusal to overturn state criminal convictions did not
necessarily reflect a lack of nerve by the Court. This was the period better known by lawyers and law students as the Lochner

of these specific topics. As Dripps notes in his introduction, the manuscript of his book
was prepared before September 11, 2001. Furthermore, no author could discuss all of the
Court’s many cases involving criminal procedure issues in a one hundred and eighty-eight
page book. In its current edition, the most popular casebook on criminal procedure is
seventeen hundred and sixteen pages in length. See YALE KAMISAR, ET AL., MODERN
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: CASES-COMMENTS-QUESTIONS (11th ed. 2005) [hereinafter
MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE].
11. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 536 (1884).
12. Id. at 535.
13. Id. at 532.
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era, in which the Court “engaged in the frequent and capricious
nullification of state economic regulations on substantive due
process grounds” (p. 15). This was also the same period when
the Court “took a noticeably pro-defense approach to federal
criminal cases” (p. 15).
According to Dripps, the Lochner-era Court’s activist
stance in federal criminal cases and economic regulation cases,
but refusal to overturn state criminal convictions “was neither
unprincipled nor disingenuous” (p. 20). Rather, “[t]he guiding
principle under the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause
was constitutional withdrawal of state power to impair fundamental liberties. The judicial refusal to intervene in state criminal
procedure reflected a sincere belief that in criminal cases, procedural protections, except of the most basic sort, are not fundamental, as are the rights to hold private property and enter into
contracts” (p. 20).
A subtle shift occurred between 1923 and 1947 when, in
Dripps’ view, the Court expanded the constitutional rights of the
accused. “During this period, the cases in which the Court reversed state convictions on due process grounds involved either
grave doubts about the reliability of the trial verdict, or the oppressive abuse of official power in obtaining evidence against the
accused” (p. 23). But this period was not the start of a “criminal
procedure revolution.” Instead, the Court’s rulings were confined to reversing especially disturbing state convictions. “The
Court made no effort to reach beyond the case to be decided, no
attempt to reform state criminal justice in any general way” (p.
23).
Chapter Two of the book outlines the Court’s initial reluctance to apply the Bill of Rights’ procedural safeguards to the
14. Lochner, of course, stands for Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). Legal
scholarship analyzing Lochner and its impact is abundant. For a recent and informative
reappraisal of Lochner itself and legal commentary on Lochner, see David E. Bernstein,
The Story of Lochner v. New York: Impediment to the Growth of the Regulatory State, in
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES 325 (Michael C. Dorf ed., 2004). While the Lochner-era
Court upheld a robust version of freedom of contract under the Fourteenth Amendment
for bakers in New York, that Court “was unwilling to protect (or, more precisely, to authorize the federal government to protect) liberty of person and freedom of contract
when it came to black Americans in the South—the original intended beneficiaries of
Reconstruction.” Pamela S. Karlan, Contracting the Thirteenth Amendment: Hodges v.
United States, 783, 784–85 (2005) (discussing history and ruling in Hodges v. United
States, 203 U.S. 1 (1906), which ruled that Congress did not have the authority pursuant
to the enforcement clause of the Thirteenth Amendment to criminalize physical violence
designed to intimidate black lumbermen into breaching labor contracts).
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states’ criminal justice procedures. The start of the chapter has a
lengthy and scholarly discussion on the adoption and ratification
of the Fourteenth Amendment, with a special focus on whether
the amendment intended to apply the Bill of Rights to the states.
In this section, Dripps considers debates in Congress, as well as
the work and arguments of nineteenth century jurists, lawyers
and legal academics. Like many scholars before him, Dripps is
skeptical of the claim that the Fourteenth Amendment makes
the Bill of Rights binding on the states. He notes that the ratification process “apparently never considered the incorporation
question” (p. 33). Dripps’ research also reveals that lawyers and
judges in the post-Reconstruction period “recoiled from equating the Bill of Rights criminal-procedure provisions with ‘privileges or immunities’ or with ‘due process’” (p. 34). The most that
can be said in favor of the total incorporation theory is that it
“has not been disproved or refuted” (p. 34). In Dripps’ view, it is
“fair to say that the thesis that a majority of those involved in
framing and ratifying the Fourteenth Amendment intended to
apply the Bill of Rights to the states has not been proved and
seems on the whole very doubtful” (p. 34).
Putting aside the intent of the Fourteenth Amendment’s
framers, Dripps explains that by the start of the 1960’s, the Court
had not yet embraced incorporation theory as a remedy for the
problems some saw in the states’ criminal justice systems. Although Wolf v. Colorado ruled in 1948 that the Fourth Amendment was a fundamental right, and was thus binding on the
15
states, Dripps appears to side with the view that Wolf’s refusal
to impose the exclusionary rule on the states made the Fourth
Amendment a dead letter in state police investigations. The subsequent rulings in Rochin v. California and Irvine v. California
confirmed that a fundamental rights regime would not impose
any obstacles for state police officials determined to ignore or
skirt Fourth Amendment protections that Wolf held were bind16
ing on the states. The same was true for state police interroga15. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
16. In Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952), police officers illegally and forcibly
entered Rochin’s home. The officers found Rochin sitting partly dressed on a bed, where
his wife was also lying. After Rochin swallowed several capsules that were located on a
table, a struggle ensued between the officers and Rochin. Rochin was taken to a hospital
and the officers ordered a doctor to pump Rochin’s stomach. The stomach pumping induced vomiting and produced two capsules, which proved to be morphine. The Court
held that admission of the capsules as evidence to convict Rochin of morphine possession
violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Due process was violated because the Court found that the officers’ conduct “shock[ed] the conscience.” Rochin, 342 U.S. at 172. In Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954), officers made repeated
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tion practices and the provision of counsel for indigent defendants facing state felony charges. The author closes Chapter Two
with a brief discussion on why, during its early years, the Warren
Court did not use the Equal Protection Clause to combat the
obvious racial discrimination routinely practiced by police officers, prosecutors and judges. “[D]iscrimination in the criminal
justice system, in contrast to education and public facilities, was
de facto, not de jure. There was no statute commanding police
abuse or unjust conviction of blacks that could be struck down
17
by a stroke of the judicial pen” (p. 43).
illegal entries into Irvine’s home and secretly installed a microphone, and then used the
microphone to obtain knowledge of his gambling activities. Although Justice Jackson’s
opinion for the Court conceded that “[F]ew police measures have come to our attention
that more flagrantly, deliberately, and persistently violated the fundamental principle
declared by the Fourth Amendment,” 347 U.S. at 1132, the Court nevertheless concluded
that this police conduct did not violate due process norms, and held that the evidence
thus obtained was admissible at Irvine’s trial. The Irvine Court distinguished Rochin by
explaining that the facts in Irvine did not involve any coercion, violence or brutality. For
a sharp criticism of the Court’s reasoning and logic in Wolf, Rochin and Irvine, see Yale
Kamisar, Wolf and Lustig Ten Years Later: Illegal State Evidence in State and Federal
Courts, 43 MINN. L. REV. 1083, 1123, 1127 (1959) (“Wolf teaches us that . . . some ‘fundamental’ rights are less ‘fundamental’ that others, less ‘immutable’ than others, less ‘basic’ than others. That evidence is not to be excluded unless it was obtained in violation of
sub-minimal standards. . . . And Irvine teaches us that some ‘incredible’ and ‘flagrant’
violations of due process are less ‘incredible’ and ‘flagrant’ than others and only when
such violations are sufficiently ‘incredible’ and ‘flagrant,’ do we exclude their fruits. . . .
[T]he reasoning in Irvine is about as unpalatable as the result. To exclude the evidence
on the ground that it involved a more serious and more shocking violation than did Wolf
‘would leave the rule so indefinite that no state court could know what it should rule to
keep its processes on solid constitutional ground.’”) (footnote omitted).
17. Professor Dripps is correct to note that the criminal justice system was plagued
by de facto discrimination, which was much more difficult to combat judicially, especially
after the Court’s 1976 decision in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (establishing
that a racially disproportionate impact is not enough, by itself, to declare a law unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause). Other scholars have argued, however, that
the Warren Court was undeniably influenced by equal protection concerns when deciding a number of its criminal procedure decisions. See, e.g., A. Kenneth Pye, The Warren
Court and Criminal Procedure, 67 MICH. L. REV. 249, 256 (1969) (“The Court’s concern
with criminal procedure can be understood only in the context of the struggle for civil
rights. . . . If the Court’s espousal of equality before the law was to be credible, it required not only that the poor Negro be permitted to vote and to attend school with
whites, but also that he and other disadvantaged individuals be able to exercise, as well as
possess, the same rights as the affluent white when suspected of crime.”); LUCAS A.
POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 386 (2000) (explaining that
the Warren Court took seriously its commitment to equality for African-Americans, who
“were disproportionately affected by whatever abuses or inequities there were in the
criminal justice system”); FRED P. GRAHAM, THE SELF-INFLICTED WOUND 13 (1970)
(“Having outlawed Jim Crow, the Court had to humble John Law. Many of its landmark
decisions on behalf of criminal defendants involved Negroes, often after they had been
caught up in that ultimate of racial trials, a prosecution for raping a white woman. Thus,
it was apparent that a moving force behind the Supreme Court’s effort to safeguard
criminal suspects was its commitment to protect the rights of Negroes.”).
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B. ANOTHER MISTAKE: MAKING THE BILL OF RIGHTS
BINDING ON THE STATES, AND THE CONSERVATIVE
REACTION TO INCORPORATION
Scholars who closely follow the Court’s criminal procedure
cases will especially enjoy the third and fourth chapters of the
book. Chapter Three is entitled “Revolution and Reaction,” and
is written in a “summary fashion, ranging widely but necessarily
not comprehensively over the entire field” of criminal procedure
(p. 69). Chapter Four is a detailed discussion and assessment of
the Court’s interrogation cases. Both chapters are well-written
and persuasive in their critiques.
In Chapter Three, Dripps describes the Warren Court’s dissatisfaction with fundamental rights analysis and its move to incorporate most of the Bill of Rights’ procedural safeguards to
the states. But this chapter also explains the reactions of the
Burger and Rehnquist Courts to the perceived activist rulings of
the Warren Court. The more conservative Justices of the Burger
and Rehnquist Courts—utilizing what Dripps calls “conservative
balancing”—curtailed (and in some cases eliminated) the constiAlthough Dripps notes that the Warrant Court did not use the Equal Protection
Clause to address the racism that pervaded the criminal justice systems of many jurisdictions, he does not deny that, in the past, the Court generally and the Warren Court specifically, did pay close attention to racial concerns when constructing criminal procedure
doctrine. Recent legal scholarship has identified a direct link between the Court’s criminal procedure jurisprudence and concerns about racist criminal justice practices. See, e.g.,
Michael J. Klarman, The Racial Origins of Modern Criminal Procedure, 99 MICH. L.
REV. 48 (2000) (“the linkage between the birth of modern criminal procedure and southern black defendants is no fortuity”); KimForde-Mazrui, Learning Law Through the
Lens of Race, 21 J. LAW & POL. 1, 12 (2005) (assessing the Court’s criminal procedure
cases “requires understanding their racial implications”). Indeed, Professor Corinna Barrett Lain has argued that:
[O]ne thing the burgeoning civil rights movement did was give the Supreme
Court a reason to distrust the states, especially on matters of criminal procedure. Yet the nation’s growing interest in protecting black Americans did something else too: it gave the Court a reason to take an interest in criminal defendants. Whether or not the Supreme Court was consciously thinking about racial
discrimination under the facts of Mapp, it knew from prior cases that the most
egregious abuses of police power were perpetrated against blacks, and that to
the extent its ruling corrected an injustice, it would have the most impact there.
Corinna Barrett Lain, Countermajoritarian Hero or Zero? Rethinking the Warren Court’s
Roe in the Criminal Procedure Revolution, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1361, 1388 (2004) (footnotes omitted); id. at 1396 (asserting that the Court was “no doubt” thinking about the
plight of black defendants in Southern courts when it decided Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335 (1963): “Gideon happened to be white, but the fact that only Southern states
had refused to provide an attorney to indigent felony defendants made the connection
impossible to ignore”). See also Carol S. Steiker, Introduction, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
STORIES viii (Carol S. Steiker ed., 2006) (“The most striking theme that emerges from
the stories behind the [Court’s criminal procedure] cases—far more than the opinions
themselves suggest—is the intersection of the criminal procedure revolution and the
struggle for racial equality, especially in the South.”).
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tutional protections of criminal suspects and defendants, without
expressly overruling the landmark decisions of the Warren
Court. As Dripps nicely describes it, “[t]he current model in
criminal procedure is conservative balancing, in which the Bill of
Rights procedural safeguards are applicable to both state and
federal cases but are qualified at every turn by the felt necessities of law enforcement” (p. 49).
The first half of Chapter Three summarily describes how
the Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Amendments have been interpreted,
first by the Warren Court, and then by the Burger and
Rehnquist Courts. A few examples illustrate the incisiveness of
Dripps’ analysis. On the Fourth Amendment, Dripps asserts that
“the Warren Court basically disincorporated the Fourth
Amendment in Terry v. Ohio” when it approved stop and frisk
18
police tactics on less than probable cause (p. 51). Another instance of the Warren Court’s favoring of law enforcement interests concerned the government’s use of informants. In a series of
cases, the Court ruled that no search occurs under the Fourth
Amendment when secret spies are planted in homes and other
private places to monitor conversations, although one year later
the Court would rule that telephone wiretapping is a search. If
the use of informants without probable cause or warrants is not a
search rests on the theory “that speakers assume the risk that
their words will be repeated, why does the fact that the interlocutor is a spy make any difference? If the risk that one’s audience includes a spy suffices to make conversations unprivate, the
government should have the right to tap telephones at will, for
there is always the chance that one party may betray the other”
(p. 52).
Later, the Burger and Rehnquist Courts narrowed the definition of probable cause and confined application of the exclusionary rule to a few discrete types of intentional violations of
the Fourth Amendment. In Dripps’ words, “in effect [United
19
States v.] Leon holds that the Constitution can be violated
18. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), held that where an officer had reasonable suspicion that a suspect was contemplating a robbery, it was reasonable to frisk the suspect
to determine whether he had a weapon on his person; this type of search was permissible
on less than probable cause because it promoted officer safety and was limited in scope
and duration.
19. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (holding that the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule does not bar the admission of evidence in the prosecution’s
case-in-chief obtained by officers relying in good faith on a search warrant issued by a
neutral magistrate which is ultimately found to be invalid).
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without any sanction or remedy whatsoever” (p. 53), and “when
the nearly toothless jaws of the exclusionary rule do threaten a
conviction in serious cases, a tolerant attitude toward police perjury can still save the day for the government” (p. 48). In sum,
incorporation of the Fourth Amendment and the exclusionary
rule has, according to Dripps, produced “the worst of all Fourth
Amendment worlds, in which the Amendment is hard to trigger,
harder to violate when it applies, virtually impossible to enforce
when it is violated, and yet is thought of as the Constitution’s
primary, almost exclusive, regulation of the police” (p. 54).
On the protections provided by the Fifth Amendment’s
Self-Incrimination Clause and the Sixth Amendment’s Right to
Counsel Clause, Dripps notes that the Warren Court’s rulings in
20
21
Escobedo v. Illinois and Gideon v. Wainwright initially indicated that the Court was prepared to impose significant reforms
on state police practices and adjudicatory procedures. Escobedo
suggested that the Court was ready “to live with the loss of confessions that would have accompanied extending the right to
counsel to the process of police interrogation” (p. 55). But the
result in Miranda ultimately showed that the Warren Court was
not willing to pay such a high cost. Indeed, “as a matter of Sixth
Amendment law, Miranda marked a major victory for the government. Police interrogation was saved from the jaws of Escobedo” (p. 57).
22
Dripps also has some unkind words for Gideon, a ruling
that “aroused wide support, and even enthusiasm, almost from
23
the moment it was announced in 1963.” What was controversial
about Gideon was not the result—“only a few Southern states
still refused to appoint counsel for indigent defendants in felony
cases” (p. 56)—but how far the Court was prepared to go to ensure that an indigent defendant received more than merely
someone with a law degree to provide “the Assistance of Coun24
sel for his defense” as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.
20. 378 U.S. 478 (1964) (emphasizing the specific facts, holding that suspect had
been denied Sixth Amendment right to counsel when, during police interrogation, suspect was not warned of right to silence and was denied opportunity to consult with a lawyer).
21. 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (holding that states must provide free defense counsel to
indigent criminal defendants charged with felonies).
22. Id.
23. Michael B. Mushlin, Gideon v. Wainwright Revisited: What Does The Right To
Counsel Guarantee Today?, 10 PACE L. REV. 327, 327 (1990). Professor Mushlin notes
that even former Attorney General Edwin Meese III, a noted critic of the Warren
Court’s criminal procedure revolution, has praised the result in Gideon. Id. at 328 n.4.
24. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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Strickland v. Washington, decided in 1984, showed that the
Burger Court was not willing to go very far. To prevail on a
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland, a defendant must prove that counsel’s mistakes caused a “breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result unreli26
able.” As Dripps explains, Strickland’s “demanding test” seems
purposefully designed to deter successful effective assistance of
counsel claims:
How is an indigent convict supposed to show on appeal that
his overworked public defender could have won the case by a
more thorough investigation? If such a convict had the resources to mount a thorough post-conviction investigation
and support the appeal with affidavits, he wouldn’t have been
represented by the public defender in the first place. And if
the investigation were inadequate, there would be no way to
prove exculpatory theories based on the very record alleged
to be incomplete or misleading. Strickland simply presumes
that the defendant convicted without a thorough investigation
by the defense is guilty (p. 58).

The reaction of the “law-and-order” Justices of the Burger
and Rehnquist Courts was not confined to cutting back the protections afforded by the Bill of Rights. The first section of Chapter three shows that “the Bill of Rights now totally dominates
the criminal procedure landscape” (p. 48), and the closing section of the chapter convincingly argues that, under the
Rehnquist Court, “due process and equal protection have fallen
into virtual desuetude” (p. 48). The atrophy of due process and
equal protection norms in criminal cases was not accidental.
In theory, substantive due process offers criminal suspects
and defendants protection for their “liberty” that is independent
of the rights guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. In Schmerber v.
California, the Warren Court left open whether certain police
27
practices might violate substantive due process. Dripps notes,
however, that since Schmerber the Court has not overturned a
conviction on substantive due process grounds. “In effect, freestanding substantive due process analysis in criminal cases has
ceased” (p. 59).

25. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
26. Id. at 687.
27. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 760 n.4 (1966).
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Nor has the modern Court been willing to seriously scrutinize state criminal trials under a procedural due process model.
Under the “instrumental” procedural due process model envisioned by Dripps, judges would have the power to invalidate
“antiquated [criminal trial] procedures that run a high risk of error,” and could mandate additional “procedural safeguards beyond those known at common law” (p. 60). An instrumental due
process approach would follow the three-part test announced in
Mathews v. Eldridge for determining the amount of process that
is required before a constitutionally protected interest can be
28
terminated by state officials. Thus, an instrumental approach
would require the judiciary “to consider the weight of the individual’s interest, the risk of error, and the cost to the government of additional procedural safeguards” (p. 60).
Besides the ruling in Ake v. Oklahoma, which Dripps con29
tends “openly consulted the Mathews factors,” the Rehnquist
Court has not been overly concerned with enforcing procedural
due process norms in criminal cases, let alone embracing the
type of instrumental due process model proposed by Dripps.
“Despite all the conservative rhetoric about criminal procedure
being about guilt and innocence, judicial restraint has proved
more valuable to the current Court than reliability in criminal
cases” (p. 61). The irony in the Court’s position is that in criminal cases instrumental concerns, such as reliability of outcome
and the dignity interests of suspects and defendants, are discounted, while in “administrative cases involving far lesser liabilities—such as suspension from public school or discharge
28. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). In Mathews, the Court explained that
“due process generally requires consideration of three distinct factors: First, the private
interests that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedures; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the
function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” Id. at 335 (citation omitted).
29. 470 U.S. 68 (1985). Ake was a capital case in which the sanity of the defendant
was a significant aspect of the trial, and the state presented evidence of the defendant’s
future dangerousness to society during the sentencing proceeding to determine whether
the death penalty should be imposed. The Court held that “when a defendant demonstrates to the trial judge that his sanity at the time of the offense is to be a significant factor at trial, the State must, at a minimum, assure the defendant access to a competent
psychiatrist who will conduct an appropriate examination and assist in evaluation, preparation, and presentation of the defense.” Id. at 83. Commentators have agreed with
Dripps that the result in Ake is grounded on procedural due process norms. See, e.g.,
MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 10, at 108 (“Although one might maintain
that a right to a court-appointed psychiatrist under certain circumstances is implicit in the
right to counsel or implements or effectuates that right, Ake is not written that way. It is
a free-standing procedural due process decision. . . .”), citing DRIPPS (p. 143).
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from public employment—Mathews controls and the focus is on
instrumental reliability” (p. 62).
Finally, the Equal Protection Clause has not required any
fundamental changes in state adjudicatory procedures. The main
reason is the Court’s narrow interpretation of the equal protection clause. Disparate racial impact alone does not violate the
Constitution. Defendants who are affected by racial bias in the
system must prove purposeful discrimination by state officials.
Because of this judge-made impediment, “[t]he practical difficulty with claims of racial discrimination in criminal justice is the
inherently difficult problem of distinguishing disparate impact
from invidious discrimination” (p. 63).
Dripps does acknowledge one bright spot in the modern
30
Court’s equal protection jurisprudence—Batson v. Kentucky. In
that case, the Court held that prosecutors could no longer use
their peremptory challenges to remove blacks from juries. The
result in Batson was prompted by at least two factors: First,
overwhelming and persuasive evidence apparently convinced the
Justices that pre-Batson law “had the effect of imposing all-white
juries on a great many black defendants. The justices surely appreciated how much damage this practice did to the appearance
of justice” (p. 65). Second, the ruling in Batson did not require
the exclusion of probative evidence of the defendant’s guilt, nor
did it result in releasing a guilty defendant.
Putting Batson aside, successful equal protection claims by
criminal suspects and defendants are as rare as a three dollar bill.
31
United States v. Armstrong typifies the Court’s deliberate indifference to claims of racial injustice. In Armstrong, a group of
black defendants claimed that they had been subject to selective
prosecution, and sought discovery from the federal prosecutor to
support their claim. After the Court of Appeals ruled that the
defendants were entitled to pursue discovery, the Supreme
Court reversed and held that discovery was permissible only
where the defendants had proven (before discovery) the essen32
tial elements of a selective prosecution claim. “How the defense
30. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
31. 517 U.S. 456 (1996).
32. Under the Court’s analysis, the defense must show both a discriminatory effect
and purpose by governmental actors. Id. at 465. Under Armstrong, “[t]o establish a discriminatory effect in a race case, the claimant must show that similarly situated individuals of a different race were not prosecuted.” Id. at 457. Magnanimously, the Court reserved the question of whether a criminal defendant must satisfy the similarly situated
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is supposed to discover evidence of discrimination without discovery is, of course, a bit of a mystery” (p. 65).
In sum, Dripps laments that modern criminal procedure
does very little, if anything, to guarantee “decent and reliable
police investigations, fair trials, and equal justice” (p. 50). As he
sees it, “[s]ubstantive due process review is a virtual dead letter
under the ‘shock the conscience’ test; procedural due process is
more concerned with history than with reliability; and [outside of
the circumscribed area protected by Batson], the equal protection clause imposes practically no restraint on police and prosecutors” (p. 69). At the same time, conservative balancing by the
Burger and Rehnquist Courts “has reduced the Bill of Rights
provisions to flexible notions of reasonable police practices or
fair adjudicatory procedures” (p. 69). Finally, Dripps believes
that the existing jurisprudence “still does too much to protect the
guilty” (p. 69).
C. THE COURT’S CRIMINAL PROCEDURE JURISPRUDENCE
IS UNPRINCIPLED CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
In Chapters Three and Four, Dripps summarizes the contradictions and doctrinal flaws in the modern Court’s criminal
procedure cases. In Chapters Five and Six, Dripps’ target is constitutional theory. Specifically, in Chapter Five he provides a
theoretical critique of the fundamental fairness, selective incorporation and conservative balancing models utilized by the
Court over the last century. Dripps asserts that the Court’s current criminal procedure doctrine “is not, as a regime, characterized by the principled consistency required of an enduring body
of constitutional law” (p. 99). He evaluates the Court’s jurisprudence using a conventionalist theory of constitutional interpretation and instrumental concerns, such as proportionate police in33
vestigative practices and reliable adjudicatory procedures.
Dripps argues that a properly functioning criminal justice system
would “institutionalize the instrumental theory of criminal procedure” (p. 110). Unless forced to do so by other constitutional
requirement in a case where the prosecutor admits a discriminatory purpose. Id. at 469
n.3.
33. According to Dripps, “[i]nvestigative practices that injure individuals can be
justified by the positive purposes of the criminal law, but only to the extent that the investigative practice is likely to prevent an imminent or continuing offense or to punish an
offense through the adjudication process. Which investigative practices implicate the exclusivity principle, and how likely they must be of securing a conviction, are important
questions that may depend on other values. The instrumental theory, however, has the
virtue of framing the issue appropriately” (p. 107).
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provisions, an instrumental model of criminal procedure would
“not place obstacles in the way of punishing the guilty except to
the extent that those obstacles protect the innocent” (p. 110). Finally, an instrumental approach “should serve rule-of-law values
by expressing the governing law as clearly and comprehensively
as circumstances permit” (p. 110).
The following is a summary of Dripps’ numerous arguments. First, Dripps believes that a fundamental fairness regime
was both too vague and heavy-handed. A fundamental fairness
model was too open-ended because:
The Court never narrowed the scope of the normative inquiry
into fundamental fairness. Fundamental fairness could be a
matter of minimizing errors, or of minimizing erroneous convictions, or of preserving individual dignity. Neutral principles
could not possibly have emerged from such an open-ended
inquiry. Similarly situated defendants would inevitably be
treated differently. Law enforcement officers and lower court
judges would not have the guidance they need to deal with the
steady volume of criminal cases implicating constitutional
standards (p. 112).

The fundamental fairness regime of the early twentieth century also “amounted to a constitutional chancellor’s foot” to
strike down state convictions at the apparent whim of a majority
of the Justices.
The vacuity of the fundamental fairness approach made it as
unjust as it was illegitimate. By permitting all values to compete in every case, the fundamental fairness standard neglected the dominant value in criminal procedure—the avoidance of erroneous punishment. At least through mid-century,
American criminal process was in many states characterized
by arbitrary arrest and search, third-degree interrogation tactics, and unreliable trial procedures. Racism was pervasive. It
was unexceptional for an indigent black to be tried without
counsel, or by all-white jury, or convicted on the force of a
confession secured by a long bout of secret questioning.
The assumption underlying the Court’s approach, however
held that state criminal process worked serious injustice only
in rare cases. . . . But the assumption was false; and as a result,
the Court became ever-more involved in reviewing state convictions, failed to achieve any meaningful reform of the criminal justice system, and could reverse the occasional suspect
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conviction only by leaving many indistinguishable ones undisturbed (p. 115).

Next, according to Dripps, the Court’s selective incorporation cases of the mid-century were flawed for several reasons.
“In a nutshell, fidelity to incorporation . . . meant betraying instrumental reliability concerns, prompting the Court (as we have
seen) to compromise incorporation to the point where the
amendments lost most of their distinctive meaning” (p. 116). To
prove his point, Dripps criticizes Gideon, a case that enjoys the
“unqualified and unanimous approval [of] judges, scholars, and
ordinary citizens” (p. 116). As we all know, Gideon ruled that
indigent defendants shall be provided free counsel when facing
state felony charges.
Concededly, “the constitutional right of indigent defendants
to appointed counsel announced in Gideon provides a critical
safeguard against unjust convictions, and a noble symbol of our
commitment to equal justice” (p. 117). But Dripps asserts that
Gideon “is as written both illegitimate and unwise” (p. 117).
Gideon is illegitimate because its holding is not supported by the
text of the Sixth Amendment. The text of the amendment provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
34
the right to . . . the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.”
Dripps explains that the text “doesn’t say anything about providing indigent defendants with publicly paid counsel” (p. 117). In
his view, “Gideon stretches the amendment to cover subsidizing
counsel for the poor,” while at the same time restricting the
scope of the amendment (p. 117). “Where the amendment says
‘all,’ Gideon reduces the amendment to covering felony cases”
(p. 117). Dripps wonders whether the Court—contrary to the
framers’ intent—would ever “uphold a federal statute that forbade a misdemeanor defendant from appearing through privately retained counsel?” (p. 117).
To be sure, Dripps believes that the result in Gideon is
sound constitutional law. But Gideon is better supported by an
instrumental due process model rather than “a formalistic focus
on the textually referenced ‘assistance of counsel’” (p. 117).
The incorporation approach necessarily failed to describe
Gideon’s constitutional right with appropriate generality.
There is nothing intrinsically valuable about lawyers; that is
why subsequent cases have developed the idea, if not the real-

34.

U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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ity, that defense counsel’s assistance must be effective. Instead, counsel is valuable to an accused because counsel is an
essential safeguard against unjust conviction. Gideon’s right
was not to a lawyer, but to a trial that ran no more than some
practically irreducible risk of falsely convicting him. . . .
[C]ounsel is constitutionally required because without counsel
the risk of unjust conviction rises beyond the irreducible (p.
117).

Practically speaking, the incorporation model neglected the
constitutional interests of indigent defendants in another way:
The Sixth Amendment says nothing about private investigators, expert witnesses, discovery against the prosecution, or
any of a number of other safeguards against unjust conviction
that may very well be at least as important as counsel in particular cases. The Court has yet to recognize that without
these safeguards, a trial can be as wanting in due process as a
trial without counsel. The delay in this recognition is at least
partly attributable to selective incorporation (p. 118).

Finally, Gideon’s reliance on the text of the Sixth Amendment “has crippled serious scrutiny of how well counsel performs
the constitutionally relevant function of defending the accused”
(p. 118). The quality of indigent defense counsel is notoriously
poor in many jurisdictions. Moreover, when errors occur at the
pre-trial stage—whether through inadequate investigations, mistaken or suggestive identification procedures, or poor plea bargaining skills—Sixth Amendment law does little to aid the defendant. “[S]o long as counsel plays the losing hand well at the
trial, there will be not finding of ineffectiveness” (p. 118).
Dripps’ criticism of the “conservative balancing” of the
Burger and Rehnquist Courts is just as biting as his criticism of
fundamental fairness and incorporation theory. Conservative
balancing “combines the worst aspects, respectively, of fundamental fairness and selective incorporation. The interests of the
suspect are seen through the narrow lens of the Bill of Rights,
while the interests of the government are as wide as the horizon
of a sympathetic judiciary” (pp. 124-25). The work product of
the Burger and Rehnquist Courts has given us a constitutional
criminal procedure regime “shot through with arbitrary distinctions” (p. 125). Moreover, the pro-police and pro-government
choices made by the “law-and-order” Justices do not promote
the appropriate values. “[T]he conservative justices never recognized that innocent people can be punished in the investigation
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process even if they are never charged. Nor did they honor the
preference for false negatives over false positives in the process
of adjudication” (p. 127).
Dripps offers several examples to support his critique, one
being the Court’s application of the exclusionary rule in Fourth
Amendment cases. With the ascendancy of the Burger Court,
the exclusionary rule was characterized as a “judicially-created
remedy,” rather than “a personal constitutional right of the per35
son aggrieved” by an illegal search and seizure. The Court has
also repeatedly stated that the purpose of the rule is deterrence,
and typically concludes that suppression of illegally obtained
evidence has a “speculative” impact on deterring police illegality.
For Dripps, the Court’s analysis “is illegitimate because it
counts violations of the Constitution as desirable” (p. 127). If no
illegality had occurred, there would be no evidence to suppress.
Under the Court’s analysis, however, the product of unconstitutional behavior is given a higher value than police obeying the
law of the land. “To view the ‘loss’ of the evidence as a ‘cost’
treats the acquisition of the evidence as a gain” (p. 127).
The illegitimacy of the Court’s reasoning “reached embarrassing” (p. 127) heights when the Court created the “good
faith” exception to the exclusionary rule in United States v. Leon.
The Fourth Amendment expressly requires that “no warrants
36
shall issue, but upon probable cause.” Leon addressed the admissibility of evidence obtained via a warrant that was not supported by probable cause. The Court ruled the evidence was
admissible if the police acted in good faith. The result in Leon
contradicts a lesson law students learn on the first day of their
Constitutional Law course: “The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protec37
tion of the laws, whenever he receives an injury.” According to
Dripps:
Because good-faith reliance on an illegal warrant also immunizes the police from damage actions, the Court in effect
eliminated all remedies for a conceded violation of the Constitution. The costs of the warrant process may make the exclusionary rule redundant in the warrant context; but the elevation of a policy preference for evidence over a constitutional

35. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906 (1984).
36. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
37. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
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preference for privacy is clearly illegitimate (pp. 127-28, foot38
notes omitted).

D. FIXING THE PROBLEMS OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:
AN INSTRUMENTAL DUE PROCESS MODEL WILL HELP
SOLVE MANY OF THE FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS OF
CURRENT DOCTRINE
Chapter Six outlines Dripps’ framework for reforming constitutional criminal procedure. The Fourteenth Amendment provides the foundation for his constitutional theory. Although
equal protection norms noticeably influence Dripps’ thinking,
“the heart of the theory is the connection between the traditional meaning of due process and the instrumental theory of
procedure” (p. 131). While portions of Dripps’ thesis are mentioned throughout the book and developed and refined over
many pages of analysis, there are two main components to his
framework for deciding constitutional criminal law cases. First,
there is a substantive element. “[T]he theory holds that the police may not deprive individuals of their liberty in the name of
law enforcement unless the severity of the deprivation bears a
reasonable relationship to the prospect of preventing or punishing an offense” (p. 131). The second element is a wide-ranging
procedural requirement. “[T]he theory holds that those accused
of crime be given the opportunity for an instrumentally reliable
trial” (p. 131). Dripps’ proposal follows the Mathews v. Eldridge
test for framing the proper inquiry for instrumental reliability
during adjudicatory procedure. But the procedural element
would also regulate police investigations “because the reliability
of the trial often turns on the reliability of the antecedent investigation” (p. 132).
Dripps is not deterred by the obvious fact that his theory
represents a significant departure from the way the Court currently decides constitutional criminal law cases. He asserts that
the upshot of the Court’s preoccupation with the Bill of Rights’
procedural provisions has “very much narrowed the meaning of
the Bill of Rights,” while also causing “a grave disservice to innocent suspects” (p. 138). Dripps convincingly notes:

38. For an interesting and lively debate on Leon and its impact on police officers
see Donald A. Dripps, Living with Leon, 95 YALE L.J. 906 (1986); Steven Duke, Making
Leon Worse, 95 YALE L.J. 1405 (1986); and Donald A. Dripps, More on Search Warrants,
Good Faith, and Probable Cause, 95 YALE L.J. 1425 (1986).
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Pretrial procedure can leave the criminal defendant facing erroneous but now entrenched identification testimony, without
the benefit of exculpatory physical evidence the police neglected to collect or preserve, defended by an overworked
lawyer with no time to conduct a new investigation. This can
(and does) happen, without any unreasonable searches, without any compelled testimony, and without any denial of counsel. The distinction between investigation and adjudication is
far less palpable than current doctrine admits (pp. 138-39).

Nor is Dripps troubled by the claim that his instrumental
model discounts historical practices and federalism concerns. He
concedes that the Rehnquist Court’s current emphasis on
“founding-era common-law practice” and “delicate attitude toward state prerogatives” may be appropriate when litigants bring
substantive due process challenges against state legislation in
civil proceedings (p. 141). But Dripps insists that these concerns
are inapt in a procedural due process analysis. “If criminal procedure should be about correctly determining guilt and innocence, constitutional doctrine should speak the language of procedural due process” (p. 141). Finally, he opines that “there is
really a much stronger case for applying Mathews in criminal
case than in administrative cases” (p. 141). While legislatures
possess the political authority to create administrative entitlements, they have “no discretionary power to create or to destroy
constitutional liberty” (p. 142). Put simply, judges owe no deference to police investigation practices and state adjudicatory pro39
cedures that threaten or extinguish an individual’s “liberty.”
39. Later in Chapter Six, Dripps argues that:
[L]egislative work in the criminal-procedure field deserves more distrust than
deference. The legislative record on preventing false convictions and police
abuse is embarrassing. Legislatures have not adopted even minimal regulations
of identification procedures, have not provided anything like adequate support
for indigent defense, and have, in the great majority of jurisdictions, even now
not yet required the recording of interrogations or consent searches. Yet legislatures have repeatedly conferred broad powers on police, and, by constantly increasing already severe penalties, have given prosecutors enormous discretionary power (p. 150).
The political bottom line is that:
[P]ro-government criminal-procedure legislation injures members of groups
with relatively little political power, and it benefits groups with relatively strong
political power. Legislatures have repeatedly demonstrated their sensitivity to
these incentives. Instead of deferring to legislative choices made against this
background, the federal courts should, consistently with the Carolene Products
footnote and the representation-reinforcing theory of judicial review, face up to
reality. If the federal courts tolerate unreliable trial procedures or police abuse,
nobody else is going to stop it (pp. 150–51).
For a detailed account of Dripps’ views on why legislatures intentionally neglect the civil
liberties of criminal suspects and defendants, see Donald A. Dripps, Criminal Procedure,
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How would Dripps’ theory differ from the other constitutional theories he criticizes? His instrumental approach would
differ from the fundamental fairness model in three ways. First,
Dripps is less concerned with whether a claimed liberty or procedural safeguard is “fundamental” to our government’s system
of order liberty; instead, his focus is on procedural due process.
“With respect to adjudicatory procedure this focus is easy to
maintain, but complications arise when procedural due process
analysis confronts police investigations” (p. 143). The instrumental model would evaluate police practices like search and seizures by asking: is the intrusion “justified by the prospect of preventing and/or prosecuting criminal offenses?” (p. 144). If the
police intrusion is motivated as a freestanding social control
measure, the question becomes: is the restraint “narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest?” (p. 144).
Second, Dripps’ instrumental model “would be far more determinate, far more sharply focused, than the inquiry into fundamental fairness” (p. 145). For example, police practices would
be judged by determining whether the police “deprived the suspect of liberty without a sufficient expectation of exposing or
preventing crime,” or whether the police “conducted the investigation in a way that prevented the suspect from having a fair
trial” (p. 145). If an adjudicatory procedure was challenged, “the
issue would be simply whether the state procedure exposed the
defendant to an unnecessary risk of false conviction” (p. 145).
The third and final difference between Dripps’ theory and a fundamental fairness regime is that an instrumental model “would
not proceed on a case-by-case basis.” Instead, following the examples of Miranda and Terry v. Ohio, “the general requirements
of procedural due process would be translated into constitutional
doctrine as general rules” (p. 145).
Dripps’ model would mark a significant change from the selective incorporation approach of the last fifty years. An instrumental model would be far more circumspect in its use of the
Bill of Rights. It would accentuate the provisions that promote
fair trial values. “To the extent that those provisions frustrate
Footnote Four, and the Theory of Public Choice; Or, Why Don’t Legislatures Give a
Damn About the Rights of the Accused?, 44 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1079, 1089 (1993) (arguing that “legislators undervalue the rights of the accused for no more sinister, and no
more tractable a cause than that a far larger number of persons, of much greater political
influence, rationally adopt the perspective of a potential crime victim, rather than the
perspective of a suspect or defendant”).
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the ends of justice without protecting the innocent against false
conviction, they should not be enforceable against the states un40
der the Fourteenth Amendment” (p. 146). On the other hand,
Dripps’ model is likely to mean greater regulation of the pretrial and adjudicatory phrases for both state and federal procedures. “For example, due process might provide the predicate
for at long last imposing some sensible regulations on the process of developing eyewitness identification evidence” (p. 146).
Lastly, an instrumental model differs from conservative balancing. Dripps believes that the current Court’s pro-government
position in criminal procedure cases is “a hangover from substantive due process adjudication” (p. 150). A shift to a procedural due process regime would eliminate the “legitimacy” problem of judges overruling legislative choices on nothing more
than the type of “fundamental” rights analysis used in cases like
41
Lochner and Roe v. Wade. At the same time, Dripps envisions
his approach as promoting federalism.
In at least one respect a procedural due process regime, even
one applied with a rigorous scrutiny by the federal courts,
would greatly strengthen the structure of federalism. A procedural due process regime could free the states from those
Bill of Rights provisions that do nothing to prevent unfair trials or police excesses. This would restore a considerable degree of state autonomy over criminal procedure. Fair trials
and proportionate police practices can take different forms.
As it stands, criminal-procedure law is now a monolith (p.
151).

PART II: DRIPPS ON POLICE INTERROGATION AND
CONFESSIONS
This part of the review focuses on police interrogation and
the Court’s efforts to regulate it. Dripps has some provocative
views on the subject. This section describes the problems Dripps
sees in the confession cases, his proposal for solving some of

40. The apparent neutrality of his model is impressive:
If the individual can show that his trial ran a needless risk of false conviction, or
that the police investigation punished him independently of any conviction, the
state should not be heard to plead compliance with the Bill of Rights as an excuse. If, by contrast, the individual fails to show anything unfair about his trial,
or any unjustified restraint or violence during the investigation, the Bill of
Rights should not be converted into a loophole (p. 147).
41. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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those problems, and my response to Dripps’ alternative constitutional vision of confession law.
A. CONFESSION LAW IS “DYSFUNCTIONAL AS WELL AS
INCOHERENT”
An entire chapter of the book—Chapter Four—is devoted
to examining how the Supreme Court has shaped (and misshaped) police interrogation practices and the law of confessions. In Chapters Five and Six, Dripps describes how his instrumental due process model would apply to police
interrogation, an area of law which has occupied the Court’s attention and generated enormous controversy for the Court since
42
the 1930’s. This is a fascinating part of the book, particularly in
light of the author’s previously published views on police interrogation and the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against selfincrimination. In an earlier article, well-known among criminal
procedure professors, Dripps explains that he is against police
interrogation as it is currently practiced in America, and against
43
the privilege against self-incrimination. In his book chapter,
Dripps skillfully identifies the many flaws and contradictions
that plague confession law. Indeed, Dripps finds little to praise
about the Court’s cases and concludes that “current law is dysfunctional as well as incoherent” (p. 97). Three examples highlight Dripps’ criticism:
First, under the fundamental fairness regime, the admissibility of a state criminal defendant’s confession was governed by a
due process “voluntariness” test, rather than the Fifth Amendment’s Self-Incrimination Clause. From 1936 to the early 1960’s
42. Although many of the Court’s confession cases over the decades have been subjected to harsh and penetrating criticism from both the right and left, compare JOESPH D.
GRANO, CONFESSIONS, TRUTH, AND THE LAW (1993), with YALE KAMISAR, POLICE
INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS: ESSAYS IN LAW AND POLICY (1980), ironically, the
Court’s first case to reverse a state criminal conviction because the confession was coerced has generally received high praise. That case was Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S.
278 (1936). For praise of Brown, see Morgan Cloud, Torture and Truth, 74 TEX. L. REV.
1211 (1996).
43. Donald A. Dripps, Foreword: Against Police Interrogation – And the Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination, 78 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 699 (1988) [hereinafter,
Dripps, Foreword]. Dripps has analyzed the Fifth Amendment privilege and police interrogation in other articles. See, e.g., Donald A. Dripps, Constitutional Theory for Criminal
Procedure: Miranda, Dickerson, and the Quest for Broad-but-Shallow, 43 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1 (2001); Donald A. Dripps, Is the Miranda Caselaw Really Inconsistent? A Proposed Fifth Amendment Synthesis, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 19 (2000); Donald A. Dripps,
Self-Incrimination and Self-Preservation: A Skeptical View, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 329
(1991).
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the “voluntariness” test mandated consideration of the all of the
circumstances surrounding the confessions, including the suspect’s subjective characteristics as well the willingness of police
to use violence. Such an open-ended standard, according to
Dripps and many others, left “[l]ower courts, police officers, and
commentators . . . never sure of which foci of the test was more
important—the subjective capacity of the suspect to resist police
pressure, or the objective tendency of the police methods to
cause a typical suspect to confess” (p. 71). Under this test, “even
physical violence to the suspect was never declared per se unconstitutional” (p. 72, footnote omitted).
Second, Escobedo’s reliance on the Sixth Amendment’s
right to counsel to protect a suspect’s constitutional rights during
interrogation, in effect, “implied the end of police interrogation”
(p. 75). If a suspect could consult with defense counsel at his will,
police interrogators could no longer count on the psychological
pressure and the secrecy that made pre-trial questioning an effective tool for the police and prosecutors. “Only the extraordinary decision in Miranda, accepting an uncounseled waiver of
counsel in a situation where the suspect needs counsel, saved police interrogation from the jaws of Escobedo” (p. 76, footnote
omitted). Although Miranda removed “the fangs of Escobedo,”
according to Dripps, Miranda itself contained an inherent contradiction:
The Miranda Court’s waiver doctrine is plainly at odds with
the rest of the opinion. As Justice White demanded in dissent,
“if the defendant may not answer without a warning a question such as ‘Where were you last night?’ without having his
answer be a compelled one, how can the Court ever accept his
negative answer to the question of whether he wants to consult his retained counsel or counsel whom the court will ap44
point?” The majority made no answer (p. 81).

44. While other scholars agree with Dripps that Miranda’s waiver theory is incoherent, see, e.g., H. RICHARD UVILLER, TEMPERED ZEAL 195–97 (1988) (arguing that “if
a confession given in police custody is necessarily coerced, so is a waiver”); Stephen J.
Schulhofer, Reconsidering Miranda, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 435, 454 (1987) (asserting that the
“notion that police-initiated warnings can ‘dispel’ the compulsion [of police interrogation] seems dubious at best”), at least one scholar takes a positive view of the way in
which the Miranda Court discusses the issue of waiver. According to Professor John
Parry:
The availability of waiver—effectively a limit on the remedy created by the
warnings—allows a reading of Miranda that deemphasizes the right to remain
silent and to be free in general of the compulsion inherent in interrogation.
With waiver, the Court concluded police interrogation is constitutionally permissible despite the fact that compulsion is inherent in it, and it may even have
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Third, the conservative Justices of the Burger and
Rehnquist Courts displayed their own contradictions when it
came to interpreting Miranda. Although the conservative Justices believed that Miranda was wrongly decided, “one index of
the conflict between conservative criminal procedure and conservative judicial method is that until the year 2000 no justice
had ever issued an opinion that urges overturning that decision”
(p. 86). In the interim, the Burger and Rehnquist Courts issued
45
46
opinions like Harris v. New York, Michigan v. Tucker, New
47
48
York v. Quarles, and Oregon v. Elstad, that could not be reconciled with Miranda, and rested on the premise that the result
49
in Miranda was not constitutionally compelled.
The best example of the Court’s “judicial hypocrisy” (p. 88)
50
in the confession cases is Dickerson v. United States, which “has
done more to confirm, than to dispel, the impression that the
Miranda cases are irreconcilable” (p. 95). In that case, the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals seized on holdings and statements from cases like Harris, Tucker, Quarles, and Elstad, indicating that Miranda was not compelled by the Constitution, to
uphold the constitutionality of Title II of the 1968 Crime Control
Bill, which had purported to overrule Miranda by statute. That
statute, 18 U.S.C. §3501, had made the admissibility of a confession turn solely on whether a statement was voluntary. Writing
for a seven-Justice majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist overruled
the Court of Appeals, held that Miranda was a constitutional ruling, and that Miranda controlled the admissibility of statements
made during police interrogation in state and federal courts. But
the Chief Justice’s opinion also made clear that rulings like Harris, Tucker, Quarles and Elstad were still good law. According to
Dripps, the Chief Justice’s opinion “is utterly conclusory” (p.

believed that some compulsion is desirable. Miranda thus implements, perhaps
imperfectly, a broad conception of fairness in criminal investigation—a better
atmosphere for suspects but without hamstringing legitimate police attempts to
solve crimes.
John Parry, Constitutional Interpretation and Coercive Interrogation after Chavez v. Martinez, 39 GA. L. REV. 733, 812–13 (2005) (footnote omitted).
45. 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
46. 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
47. 467 U.S. 649 (1984).
48. 470 U.S. 298 (1985).
49. See also DRIPPS (p. 126) (“A Court that was truly bound by Miranda would not
have decided Harris, [Michigan v.] Mosley, and Quarles.”).
50. 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
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96), and there is no sign that a future opinion will remove the
contradictions and tensions in confession law.
B. APPLYING INSTRUMENTAL PROCEDURAL DUE
PROCESS TO POLICE INTERROGATION
How would Dripps solve the problems that plague confession law? In Chapters Five and Six, Dripps provides an alternative framework for fixing the problems he sees. First, Dripps
notes that the “most difficult challenge to any critic of Miranda
is to overcome all the bad arguments other critics have made
against that decision” (p. 119). Miranda’s critics incessantly argue that police interrogation, free of judicial obstacles, can help
solve violent crimes and identify and convict perpetrators that
might otherwise go unpunished. “Undoubtedly this point is true,
but those who make it never face up to the contradiction, implicit or explicit, in squaring the objection with the Constitution. . . . [C]ritics of Miranda fail to reconcile the desire for evidence with the right to remain silent” (p. 119).
On the other hand, Miranda’s defenders fail to come to
grips with the inconsistency in Miranda itself which “inexplicably
allows the accused to make a ‘knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver’ of the right to silence under the very same pressures
that are thought to constitute compulsion in the first place” (p.
119). According to Dripps, waiver is so common that “Miranda
has not diminished significantly the effectiveness of police interrogation” (p. 119, footnote omitted). Ultimately, the crucial issue
raised by Miranda “is how to prevent police brutality without
giving up confessions” (p. 120).
Dripps’ instrumental procedural due process model would
permit “rational regulation of police questioning—recording requirements, time limits, and so on” (p. 147). Interestingly, his
model would also allow lawyers in the interrogation room.
Lawyers obviously impair the ability of the police to obtain
Miranda waivers. The bottom-line reasoning for not recognizing the right to counsel until the commencement of formal
proceedings is that the Fifth Amendment privilege means that
the only practical window for interrogation is the period following arrest but preceding the appointment of counsel. . . .Once the suspect’s rights are defined in terms of instrumental procedural considerations—that is, calculated to
protect the innocent but not to shield the guilty—the fear of
lawyers would abate (p. 148).
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Dripps acknowledges the need to close the “window of virtual
lawlessness—between the arrest and the filing of charges” (p.
181), and understands that counsel’s presence is an effective way
to do so. But there is a price for counsel’s presence. Under
Dripps’ model a suspect could be questioned—either by a judge
or the police—in counsel’s presence, and even retain the right to
remain silent, subject, however, to a permissive adverse inference at trial (pp. 148, 181).
51
Obviously, the holding in Griffin v. California is an obstacle to implementing Dripps’ reform of confession law. Griffin
ruled that the privilege against self-incrimination barred adverse
comments from either the judge or prosecutor to a jury about a
defendant’s failure to testify at trial. As Dripps explains, Griffin
rested on at least two concerns. One, “an innocent defendant
may refuse to testify at trial because of the fear of impeachment
with prior convictions” (p. 181). Second, the Court felt certain
innocent defendants—the timid or the nervous—if forced to testify at trial, might do themselves more harm than good when attempting to explain on the witness stand “transactions of a suspi52
cious character” or some prior offense.
Dripps’ rebuttal to Griffin’s concerns is two-fold. First, he
would ban prosecutors’ use of prior offenses for impeachment
purposes when defendants testify at trial. The defense would
also enjoy “the right to introduce . . . pretrial testimony without
opening the door to impeachment with prior convictions” (p.
181). Second, he believes that the problems associated with timid
and nervous innocent defendants will be diminished if their testimony is taken before trial. “If the accused makes a misstep out
of confusion or ignorance, there is time to take corrective action.
For example, a motion might be made to exclude the pretrial
statement as unreliable, or to reopen the pretrial proceeding so
the defendant could put in additional clarifying testimony” (p.
182). Dripps contends that police interrogation under his proposal would “greatly reduce the risk of innocent suspects falsely
incriminating themselves,” and “end the ability of sophisticated
offenders to permanently insulate themselves from humane
53
questioning” (p. 182).
51. 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
52. Id. at 613 (quoting Wilson v. United States, 149 U.S. 60, 66 (1893)).
53. Dripps opines that his proposal “might be sustainable” under Griffin, but does
not elaborate why. He does, however, emphasize the benefits of his proposal for both the
defense and prosecution. The accused would benefit because “the right to counsel could
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C. DRIPPS’ MODEL FOR POLICE INTERROGATIONS WILL
BENEFIT THE PROSECUTION WHILE DISADVANTAGING THE
DEFENDANT
Critiquing this proposal would be a lot easier if one could
characterize Dripps as a “law-and-order” guy, hell-bent on
eliminating the few remaining restrictions that currently apply to
police interrogations. But Dripps’ skeptical views on police interrogation practices and confessions are well-known. For example, he has noted “[a]ny expectation that truly voluntary confessions are available on a systemic basis depends either on
unsupportable factual assumptions or on an interpretation of
voluntariness that reduces that word to signifying no more than
54
the absence of third degree methods.” He has also opined that
“[t]ypical police interrogation surely constitutes compulsion in
55
any sense of that word,” and that confessions amount to “de
facto guilty pleas” absent the “complete understanding of the
consequences and alternatives” that the Court requires for de
56
jure guilty pleas. Furthermore, Dripps has convincingly argued
that “Miranda does no more (indeed, it does significantly less)
than take the Fifth Amendment seriously. Every argument
against Miranda applies with greater strength to the privilege in
57
general.” Many of these views are repeated in his book.
Finally, if applied to the law of confessions, Dripps’ instrumental model would provide greater protections for suspects
than previous proposals for judicially supervised interrogation, a
concept that has often been proposed to cure the abuses associ58
ated with police-dominated interrogation. And Professor Yale
Kamisar, Miranda’s strongest and most articulate defender, has
characterized proposals for judicially supervised interrogation
less protective than the one outlined by Dripps “as inherently
stronger than the Miranda requirements, at least as the latter
59
have generally been applied.”
be extended to the moment of arrest” (p. 182). The government would benefit because it
could afford to file charges promptly, and would be allowed to “to take prompt, crossexamined, videotaped depositions from the witnesses” (id.).
54. Dripps, Foreword, supra note 43, at 700.
55. Id. at 725 (footnote omitted).
56. Id. at 704.
57. Id. at 728.
58. Proposals for judicially supervised interrogation have been around since the late
1800’s. See Yale Kamisar, Kauper’s “Judicial Examination of the Accused” Forty Years
Later—Some Comments on a Remarkable Article, 73 MICH. L. REV. 15, 15 n.3 (1974).
59. Id. at 37. Because Dripps’ proposal incorporates many of the concerns of
Miranda’s defenders, Professor Kamisar’s comments are worth quoting in full:
Assuming arguendo that the comment on the suspect’s silence authorized by
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Although Dripps is no fan of police interrogation (or the
Fifth Amendment), he does believe that interrogation is an es60
sential police practice that society cannot do without. He believes that an instrumental due process regime would permit fair
and reasonable interrogation without tolerating lawless discretion or police abuse. Generally speaking, under a model that focuses on procedural values, “a very powerful case can be made
for requiring the taping of interrogations, including the administration of the Miranda warnings and the suspect’s waiver” (p.
185). Specifically, as already noted, Dripps would permit access
to counsel from the moment of arrest, and permit a suspect to
refuse to answer police questions, conditioned on a trial court’s
authority to draw an adverse inference of guilt from the accused’s refusal to speak during any pretrial confrontations with
the police or prosecutor. Ultimately, Dripps model is designed to
have police interrogations practices “calculated to protect the
innocent but not to shield the guilty” (p. 148).
I agree with many of Dripps’ conclusions about the Court’s
criminal procedure doctrine. I also share his skepticism that existing police interrogation methods routinely produce “voluntary” confessions, and wholeheartedly endorse his critique of the
modern Court’s Miranda rulings, particularly his criticism of
Dickerson. That said, I cannot embrace his alternative vision for
confession law.

[previous proposals for judicial interrogation] exerts significantly greater “compulsion” to speak than that allowed to operate under Miranda—the informal
pressure to “avoid looking guilty” when confronted by anyone in authority under any circumstances and the additional “compulsion” inherent in police custodial surroundings—the comment feature should not be judged and condemned in a vacuum. It is only a small part of an attractive package whose
provisions for judicial warnings, judicial supervision of any ensuing interrogation, and objective recording of the entire proceeding seem inherently stronger
than the Miranda requirements, at least as the latter have generally been applied. Not only [do previous proposals for judicial interrogation] go a considerable distance toward investing the interrogation proceedings with the “protective openness and formalities of a court trial,” but [they] “tend to promote the
speedy production of the suspect before a magistrate,” offer[ ] “the most efficient way of providing legal counsel upon arrest,” and “meet the equal protection argument; the rich man and the professional criminal could no longer remain silent without adverse consequences.”
Id. (footnotes omitted).
60. DRIPPS (p. 120) (noting that “in Miranda the central question is how to prevent
police brutality without giving up confessions”); Dripps, Foreword, supra note 43, at 724
(“What we are looking for is an interpretation of the Constitution that allows interrogation but that does not depend on rejecting constitutional value judgments.”) (emphasis
added).
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For starters, Dripps’ proposal creates a serious strategic dilemma for criminal defense lawyers. If a suspect has access to
counsel from the moment of arrest—a reform Dripps recognizes
as necessary to close “a window of virtual lawlessness” that currently exists between the arrest and the filing of charges—no
competent lawyer will advise her client to talk with the police,
even assuming that the lawyer believes a client’s claim of inno61
cence. A skilled lawyer is going to conduct her own investigation before she allows her client to speak with law enforcement
officials, and even after such an investigation, some lawyers
never permit their clients to talk with the police. But under
Dripps’ proposal, such a strategy has a significant cost—an adverse inference at trial. From a lawyer’s perspective, this is a
“damned if you do, damned if you don’t” choice. Nor will the accused be better positioned to second-guess his lawyer’s advice,
whatever the lawyer advises him to do. The only side that benefits is the government. In the unlikely event that the lawyer advises her client to speak, the police may obtain an incriminating
statement or evidence that can later be used against the ac62
cused. And if the accused refuses to answer any questions, an
adverse inference can later be raised at trial.
Of course, under Dripps’ proposal, the innocent accused
could refuse to answer questions, go to trial subject to an adverse
inference, and then take the stand to explain why he did not talk
to the police at an earlier occasion. This too, is a very risky strategy. Professor Stephen Schulhofer has cogently detailed some of
the practical reasons why a lawyer would not put her client on
the witness stand:
61. See, e.g., F. LEE BAILEY & KENNETH J. FISHMAN, CRIMINAL TRIAL
TECHNIQUES § 1:12, at 1–17 (2002) (“The most important discussion you will ever have
with your client in a criminal case will be the initial interview. . . . You cannot emphasize
enough the absolute necessity that your client not speak with anyone, particularly law
enforcement agents.”) (emphasis added).
62. Dripps contends that securing the accused’s statement before trial advantages
the defense. “If the accused makes a misstep out of confusion or ignorance, there is time
to take corrective actions. For example, a motion might be made to exclude the pretrial
statement as unreliable, or to reopen the pretrial proceeding so the defendant could put
in additional clarifying testimony” (p. 182). Such an opportunity to clarify the record may
provide cold comfort for lawyers and their clients. If the accused talks to the police and
makes an incriminating statement, or makes a statement that leads to incriminating evidence, query whether such statement can be later excluded as “unreliable.” Certainly any
physical evidence obtained as a result of the statement will not be considered “unreliable.” Further, if the accused “makes a misstep out of confusion or ignorance” during a
pretrial confrontation with the police, why would his lawyer run the risk of returning her
client to the stand to provide “clarifying testimony”? And even if other witnesses could
provide additional clarifying information, wouldn’t the judge or jury want to hear from
the accused himself to explain what he meant during his initial statement to the police?
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There are likely to be suspicious transactions or associations
that your innocent client will have to explain. But he may
look sleazy. He may be inarticulate, nervous or easily intimated. His vague memory on some of the details may leave
him vulnerable to a clever cross-examination. Most ordinary
citizens find that being a witness in any formal proceeding is
stressful and confusing. The problems are bound to be heightened when the witness happens to be on trial for his life or his
liberty. Some people can handle this kind of situation, but
others, especially if they are poor, poorly educated or inarticulate, cannot. They may handle the trial experience poorly
63
whether or not they are guilty.

Furthermore, assume that a lawyer advises a client to speak
with the police. What steps may the police or prosecutor then
take to elicit a statement from the accused? Would the police be
permitted to exert greater pressure on the accused because he
has spoken with counsel and counsel is present? “What if the
suspect started to show signs of weakening? Should the [interrogator] keep up the pressure, to get a confession? Or should he
ease off so that he would not overbear the suspect’s will? The
due process approach in effect instructed the officer to do
64
both.” Furthermore, what types of police trickery are permissible under an instrumental procedural regime? Can the police lie
to the accused? The same issues and conflicts that existed (and
65
still exist) under the due process voluntariness test will surface
whenever the police interrogate the accused, with or without
counsel being present.
To be sure, Dripps’ proposal cannot be dismissed because it
fails to anticipate every factual scenario that might arise in the
interrogation context. The pace and direction of an interrogation, just like the factual issues that may arise during police questioning, are not likely to be anticipated by the accused (or his
counsel). The key point is that a police interrogation, with or
without counsel, is not designed to be a “fair hearing” for the accused. In fact, there is nothing at all “fair” about police interro63. Stephen J. Schulhofer, Some Kind Words for the Privilege Against SelfIncrimination, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 311, 330 (1991) [hereinafter Schulhofer, Some Kind
Words].
64. Id. at 326 (footnote omitted).
65. See, e.g., Miller v. Fenton, 796 F. 2d 598 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 989
(1986) (finding that a police interrogation was not coercive and incriminating statements
given by defendant were voluntary under due process even though interrogation ended
when the defendant collapsed into a catatonic state and was transported to the hospital).
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gation, at least from the accused’s perspective. It is a confrontation where the police hold all the cards but one, which is why
lawyers always advise their clients not to talk. Silence is the one
card that the accused retains.
Second, Dripps’ entire instrumental due process theory is
based on the premise that criminal procedure rules should seek
to punish the guilty and protect the innocent. As he puts it,
“[u]nless constrained to do so by constitutional authority, criminal procedure should not place obstacles in the way of punishing
the guilty except to the extent that those obstacles protect the
innocent” (p. 110). This premise is evident in his proposal on police interrogation. Surely an innocent person will talk with the
police, particularly in the presence of counsel. After all, what
does an innocent person have to lose by talking with the police?
Only the guilty will have an incentive not to talk. And that incentive will be lessened by the ability of the judge or prosecutor
to draw an adverse inference at trial about the defendant’s pretrial silence.
An innocent person, however, can lose his liberty by talking
to the police. Silence can protect the innocent, as well as the
67
guilty. As recent empirical studies show, and countless stories
in the national press reveal, innocent people sometimes do con68
fess to crimes they did not commit. Admittedly, Dripps ac66. Dripps is well aware of this fact: “It should be remembered . . . that police interrogation is not a deposition. It is, as the case may be, manipulative, confrontational, or
fraudulent” (p. 129).
67. Samuel R. Gross et al., Exonerations in the United States 1989 Through 2003, 95
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 523, 544–46 (2005) (finding that between 1989 and 2004,
fifty-one defendants confessed to crimes they had not committed: “[o]ne defendant
falsely confessed to larceny; nine falsely confessed to rape; and forty-one . . . falsely confessed to murder”). See also, Richard A. Leo & Richard J. Ofshe, The Consequences of
False Confessions: Deprivations of Liberty and Miscarriages of Justice in the Age of Psychological Interrogation, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 429, 478 (1998) (analyzing the
consequences of false confessions on defendants in a study of sixty cases where the police
induced confessions out of suspects later proven innocent, and where the confession was
otherwise unsupported by any reliable evidence; “In practice, criminal justice officials
and lay jurors often treat confession evidence as dispositive, so much so that they often
allow it to outweigh even strong evidence of a suspect’s factual innocence.”); Steven A.
Drizin & Richard A Leo, The Problem of False Confessions in the Post-DNA World, 82
N.C. L. REV. 891, 892 (2004) (examining 125 cases of false confessions induced by police
interrogation and concluding that “the problem of interrogation-induced false confession
in the American criminal justice system is far more significant than previously supposed”).
68. See, e.g., Charges Dropped After no DNA Match: Police Will Try to Find Killer,
BELVILLE NEWS DEMOCRAT, Jun. 20, 2005, at B3 (Police say father of murdered girl
admitted to staging her death to look like an abduction after killing her accidentally. The
father was released from custody after DNA evidence fails to link him to the crime);
Sharon Begley, Interrogation methods can elicit confessions from innocent people, WALL
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knowledges that “[s]ome innocent persons confess under [the]
pressures” of interrogation, and that “many more are needlessly
69
subjected to them” (p. 129, footnote omitted). And he suggests
that his proposal “would greatly reduce the risk of innocent suspects falsely incriminating themselves” (p. 182). But the best
70
guarantee against false confessions is silence. If suspects do not
talk to the police, they greatly reduce the chances that a false
71
confession will be admitted into evidence at a subsequent trial.
ST. J., Apr. 15, 2002, at B1 (“of the first 130 exonerations that the New York-based Innocence Project obtained via DNA evidence, 85 involved people convicted after false confessions”); Fred Grimm, Another failure of justice system, MIAMI HERALD, Jun. 8, 2003,
at 1 (man spends 12 years in prison based on false confession and is later exonerated by
DNA evidence); Tim McGlone, Judge wants new suspect in killing identified; DNA
cleared man convicted of ’82 crime but implicated another, whose identity is secret,
VIRGINIAN-PILOT & STAR LEDGER, Aug. 22, 2003, at B4 (mildly retarded man who was
convicted and received death sentence based on his false conviction was exonerated
based on DNA evidence); Jean M. Templeton, Shutting Down Death Row, AMERICAN
PROSPECT, Jul. 1, 2004, at A8 (mentally ill man gave a videotaped confession to his
mother’s murder. He was later released after DNA testing pointed to another suspect);
Christopher Wills, False Confessions: Taping interrogations won’t protect suspects from
themselves, ASSOCIATED PRESS ALERT, July 17, 2005 (man who confessed to a hit and
run that killed his girlfriend released after a year in jail when physical evidence proved
that he could not have committed the crime; expert says innocent suspects often give realistic confessions because they are able to glean facts from those the police give during
prolonged interrogations).
69. See also DRIPPS (p. 97) (noting that at “least a few [suspects] who waive their
[Miranda] rights end up confessing to crimes they did not commit”). Apparently, Dripps
has retreated from his earlier view that the privilege merely protects against a “purely
hypothetical risk to the innocent” defendant, and that there are “no real cases in which
the privilege protects an innocent defendant.” Dripps, Foreword, supra note 43, at 716.
70. Cf. Schulhofer, Some Kind Words, supra note 63, at 329 (“Supporters of the
privilege never claim that it is essential for most innocent defendants or that it helps the
innocent more than the guilty. The claim is only that the privilege helps many innocent
defendants and that acquitting these innocents is more important than convicting an
equal or somewhat larger number of guilty defendants.”).
71. Of course, even when suspects choose not to talk with the police, they run the
risk that the police will manufacture fake evidence and induce guilty pleas for crimes the
suspects did not commit. The LAPD Rampart Scandal became a prime example of the
way in which innocent people are often pressured into confessing to crimes they did not
commit. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, The Role of Prosecutors in Dealing With Police
Abuse: The Lessons of Los Angeles, 8 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 305, 306 (2001) (due to the
corruption of LAPD officers who fabricated evidence and gave false testimony,
“[i]nnocent men and women plead guilty to crimes they did not commit and were convicted by juries on the basis of fabricated cases.”); Valerie Alvord, Police scandal in LA
puts convictions in doubt, USA TODAY, Nov. 12, 1999, at A4 (Lawyer advised his client
to plead guilty despite the client’s protests that he had been falsely accused—the man
was convicted, but later proclaimed innocent when it was found that he was a victim of
the LAPD Rampart corruption scandal); Peter J. Boyer, Bad Cops, NEW YORKER, May
21, 2001, at 60, 70–72 (Noting that LAPD “bad cop” turned informant, Rafael Perez,
provided investigators with information about how LAPD officers had framed suspects
and falsified information which led to the arrests and convictions of over a hundred innocent men, most of whom plead guilty); Lou Cannon, One Bad Cop, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1,
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The innocent suspect who chooses silence, however, will pay
a price under Dripps’ proposal. The suspect who refused to
speak with the police will be confronted with his silence, and his
judgment to remain silent will be used against him. At trial, such
a defendant will be compelled to counter the judge or prosecu72
tor’s use of his prior “testimony”:
Compulsion arises directly from the trial court’s willingness to
use the defendant’s own testimony against him, against his
will. The “testimony” is the defendant’s communicative act
(like a nod or a shrug), his physical response to the implicit
question, “How do you explain this evidence against you?” In
effect, the defendant’s implicit response is placed in evidence
to support an inference about his own knowledge and state of
73
mind.

Ironically, though intended to protect innocent persons, application of Dripps’ proposal might actually hurt the innocent
suspect. Empirical data plainly shows that innocent suspects
have harmed themselves by talking with the police. Because they
chose to talk with the police, some of these suspects have been
charged, convicted and imprisoned for crimes that they did not
commit. Although a competent attorney would not advise her
2000, § 6 (Magazine), at 32, 36 (Commenting on how he and others had framed innocent
people, Officer Rafael Perez claimed “that in Rampart Crash it was commonplace to set
up gang members on weapons and drug charges. He added that such tactics had the approval of his commanding officer . . . In his interviews with police investigators, Perez
made clear that he saw nothing wrong with setting up gang members.”); Linda Deutsch,
Man framed by LAPD Freed; Scandal: DA’s Office Says as many as 40 cases under review, LONG BEACH PRESS-TELEGRAM, Nov. 19, 1999, at A18 (Man who pleaded no contest to possession for sale of cocaine base and controlled substances was proclaimed innocent and released from jail after LAPD officers were found to have planted evidence
on the man); Ted Rohrlich, Scandal shows why innocent plead guilty, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 3,
1999, at A1 (“In offering criminal defendants these kinds of . . . choices [between pleading guilty and receiving a lesser sentence and risking trial and getting the maximum sentence], prosecutors and judges did not set out to induce innocent men to plead guilty—
although that is what they did. The prosecutors and judges merely accepted the word of
the Los Angeles police that the men were guilty.”).
72. It is not clear whether Dripps would permit both judge and prosecutor to comment at trial on the suspect’s pretrial silence (pp. 148, 181). The distinction is not trivial.
As Professor Peter Arenella explains with regard to a defendant’s trial silence:
[O]nce one grants that the defendant’s trial silence constitutes probative evidence that the jury may consider, the prosecutor should be permitted to comment on such evidence during her closing argument. The only argument for
prohibiting prosecutorial comment—that the jury may give such silence undue
weight after listening to the prosecutor’s summation—is less than compelling.
Erroneous eyewitness testimony probably is responsible for most convictions of
the factually innocent, but such a reliability problem does not generate a rule
that only the court can comment on its probative value.
Peter Arenella, Foreword: O.J. Lessons, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1233, 1245 n.28 (1996).
73. Schulhofer, Some Kind Words, supra note 63, at 334–35.
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client, innocent or not, to talk with the police without conducting
her own investigation, Dripps’ proposal burdens the attorney
and client with the difficult task of rebutting the client’s earlier
silence. As Professor Schulhofer has explained, an innocent defendant will often choose silence at trial “because his judgment is
74
that testifying will increase the chances of conviction.” The
same is true for the innocent defendant who chooses silence at a
pretrial confrontation with the police. Dripps’ proposal, however, will inevitably compel some innocent defendants to testify
at trial. And the innocent defendant who is forced to testify at
trial to explain his pre-trial silence will be in the same risky position already described by Professor Schulhofer. “A decision to
compel their potentially unreliable testimony involves not only
the ever-present risk of convicting the innocent, but also a serious problem of fairness. . . . [T]he concern is with the predicament of an innocent defendant who fears he will be manipulated,
75
intimidated or misunderstood.”
Finally, if fairness (or fair procedure) is a legitimate value to
promote, why focus only on the innocent suspect? Dripps readily
acknowledges that police interrogation can be “manipulative,
confrontational, or fraudulent” (p. 129), that under current doctrine “[r]ecording requirements, time limits, and the prohibition
of particularly sub dolis interrogation tactics have proved the
road not taken” (p. 97), and that “because of the privilege against
self-incrimination, there is a gap—a window of virtual lawlessness—between the arrest and the filing of charges” (p. 181).
I suspect that Dripps would also agree that the current system of police interrogation does little to protect the interests of
innocent suspects, other than to inform them of their right to
remain silent and the right to have counsel present during an interrogation. Putting that fact aside, however, are guilty suspects
not equally entitled to the concerns acknowledged by Dripps?
From an instrumental perspective, why should guilty suspects be
subjected to “manipulative, confrontational, or fraudulent” interrogation practices? If “[r]ecording requirements, time limits,
and the prohibition of particularly sub dolis interrogation tactics” are important features under an instrumental regime,
shouldn’t these safeguards be equally available to guilty suspects? Finally, why should guilty suspects be subjected to “a
74. Id. at 331.
75. Id. at 332.
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window of virtual lawlessness—between the arrest and the filing
of charges”?
Dripps’ instrumental procedural due process model would
disincorporate the privilege as applied to the states, but would
retain (and add) crucial procedural safeguards of modern confession law, including Miranda warnings, the right to refuse to
answer questions, and the requirement that a suspect knowingly
and voluntarily waive his rights. Dripps insists that his procedural model would significantly reduce the chances of false confessions by innocent suspects and “end the ability of sophisticated offenders to permanently insulate themselves from
humane questioning” (p. 182). To be sure, Dripps’ discussion of
his proposal does not contain the disdain some scholars and
commentators have shown for the Court’s interpretation of the
76
privilege. Nevertheless, Dripps’ proposal to reform confession
law, like others before him, has a tone that suggests that guilty
suspects are less deserving of constitutional protection than innocent suspects.
Although he would no longer make the privilege applicable
to the states, interestingly, Dripps does not disavow a suspect’s
right to refuse to answer police questions during interrogation.
In fact, he appears to endorse the right, subject to an adverse inference at trial. As I have already explained, that position makes
the right to silence meaningless. Dripps’ proposal would also effectively eliminate the right to stop custodial interrogation, another crucial, but often ignored, component of Miranda. But assuming Dripps does not intend to make the right to silence
pointless, aren’t guilty suspects equally entitled to a meaningful
interpretation and application of a right that Dripps does not
deny them?
Put another way, if all persons, the guilty and innocent
alike, have a right to remain silent, should not that right count
for something when the state brings criminal charges against
them? The right to silence deserves respect, at both the pretrial
and trial stages. This means that guilty suspects will be able to
“insulate themselves from humane questioning” if they so
77
choose. It also means that guilty defendants who choose silence
76. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Taking the Fifth Too Often, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18,
2002, at A15; Mickey Kaus, The Fifth Is Now Obsolete, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 1986, at
A15. For a detailed discussion of Professor Amar’s views on the Fifth Amendment, see
Akhil Reed Amar & Renee B. Lettow, Fifth Amendment First Principles: The SelfIncrimination Clause, 93 MICH. L. REV. 857 (1995).
77. Professor Richard Leo’s empirical work indicates that experienced criminals are
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at trial will be rolling the dice in terms of what the jury may infer
78
from their silence. But respect for the right to silence, whether
asserted at a pre-trial confrontation with the police or at trial,
does not permit a court to “solemnize[] the silence of the ac79
cused into evidence against him.”
If Dripps agrees with me (as I suspect he does) that the right
80
to silence is worthy of respect, then respect must be afforded to
all suspects, both innocent and guilty, who confront police interrogation. Dripps’ proposal for judicial or “humane” police questioning of the accused provides for access to counsel, Miranda
warnings, and a meaningful waiver of the right to silence. Dripps
believes that such a system will provide an effective mechanism
for interrogation without the manipulation, coercion, and abuse
that currently plagues the system. But Dripps’ proposal, with
these safeguards, assumes a right to silence, which, of course, is
the core protection provided by the Fifth Amendment’s privilege. Over a time, such a system might have developed from
principles derived from the Due Process Clause (particularly if
five Justices had Dripps’ attitude toward police interrogation
and confessions), but the Fifth Amendment privilege is a more
direct way to the same endpoint.
On the other hand, one can imagine a pro-police critic of
Dripps’ proposal arguing that a principled interpretation of the
Due Process Clause would not have supported the “detailed
81
code of interrogation rules” favored by Dripps. While I agree
less likely to talk with the police during custodial interrogation. See Richard A. Leo, Inside the Interrogation Room, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 266, 286 (1996) (“[A] suspect with a felony record in my sample was almost four times as likely to invoke his
Miranda rights as a suspect with no prior record and almost three times as likely to invoke as a suspect with a misdemeanor record.”).
78. Of course, Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288 (1981), held that a trial judge, when
requested to do so by the defendant, must give a cautionary instruction to the jury not to
draw an adverse inference from the defendant’s refusal to testify.
79. Schulhofer, Some Kind Words, supra note 63, at 335.
80. In an earlier article, Dripps brought to my attention an important fact that I had
overlooked in many years of studying Miranda. He pointed out that two of Miranda’s
harshest critics, Professors Fred Inbau and Gerald Caplan, in articles condemning
Miranda, had never “urge[d] abolishing the right to silence in the face of police questioning nor denie[d] its existence in positive law.” Dripps, Foreword, supra note 43, at 714
n.63. See Fred E. Inbau, Over-Reaction—The Mischief of Miranda v. Arizona, 73 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 797 (1982); Gerald M. Caplan, Questioning Miranda, 38 VAND. L.
REV. 1417 (1985).
81. See, e.g., GRANO, supra note 42, at 120:
Although the rights that Miranda created were unprecedented in federal constitutional law, the Court’s conclusion that the Fifth Amendment’s protection
from compulsory self-incrimination is “fully applicable during a period of cus-
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with Dripps that a due process model could support the procedural safeguards he favors, I do wonder why such safeguards are
mandatory on the states if the Fifth Amendment privilege does
82
not require them.
Fundamentally, Dripps and I agree that there is an “inevitable tension that exists in the simultaneous commitment to police
83
interrogation and to the privilege against self-incrimination.”
84
Miranda did not resolve this tension. If anything, Miranda highlighted the conflict between the privilege and police interrogation, and initially left one side of the debate—police officials and
their political defenders—angry at the Court for interfering in
the first place. Because Dripps believes that confessions and police interrogation are necessary components of a wellfunctioning criminal justice system, he would resolve the tension
between interrogation and the privilege by making the privilege
no longer binding on the states.
The Fifth Amendment should remain binding on the states
not because “guilty” suspects should be immune from “humane”
questioning. Rather, the Fifth Amendment should bind state officials because there is a need to restrain police interrogations
85
directed at both guilty and innocent suspects. A constitutional
todial interrogation” was perhaps even more significant from a jurisprudential standpoint. By thus leaving the due process “totality of circumstances” approach behind,
the Court enabled itself to fashion a detailed code of interrogation rules that due
process jurisprudence could never have supported. Moreover, by shifting constitutional gears from Fourteenth Amendment due process to Fifth Amendment
self-incrimination, the Court avoided the need formally to overrule decades of
due process precedent that had rejected litmus tests for the admissibility of confessions.
82. See Schulhofer, Some Kind Words, supra note 63, at 327 (noting that critics of
the Fifth Amendment privilege who favor a regime of judicial questioning of the accused
under oath, but also favor restraining or prohibiting outright police interrogation of the
accused, “never quite explain how that result could be achieved without the Fifth
Amendment in place, or why it should be achieved if the Fifth Amendment is basically
unsound”).
83. Thomas, supra note 6, at 823. I believe Dripps agrees with this assertion because
he has previously recognized the conflict that exists between the Fifth Amendment and
police interrogation. Dripps, Foreword, supra note 43, at 727–28 (“The Court’s efforts to
enforce the Fifth Amendment necessarily entail a morally unjustifiable loss of evidence,
while its efforts to preserve police interrogation because of its evidentiary value necessarily entail a legally unjustifiable derogation of the constitutional decision to include the
privilege in our fundamental law.”).
84. See Schulhofer, Confessions and the Court, 79 MICH. L. REV. 865, 883–84 (1981)
(“Miranda does not, any more than the due process test, come directly to grips with the
dilemma arising from our simultaneous commitments to the privilege against selfincrimination and to a law enforcement system in which police interrogation is perceived
as a necessity.”).
85. A noted critic of the Fifth Amendment privilege, Professor David Dolinko, also
seems unwilling to abolish the privilege, in part, because “Miranda and its progeny have

!MACLIN-REVIEWACRIMINALPROCEDUREREGIMEBASEDON.DOC

5/9/2006 5:31:44 PM

236

[Vol. 22:197

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

standard or rule based on due process, as applied by the current
Court, will not protect against the same abuses, trickery, manipulation, and “compelled” choices that the Fifth Amendment
bars.
Applying the privilege to the states may have been a “radi86
cal break” from precedent, but the Warren Court’s shift from a
due process model to a Fifth Amendment model to regulate police interrogation was intended, inter alia, to provide greater protection for suspects, because the due process regime was not
working. “Miranda had brought Fifth Amendment standards
into the stationhouse under the expressly stated assumption that
those standards provided more protection than the traditional
87
Fourteenth Amendment protections.” The due process model
barred confessions that were “coerced” or “involuntary,” while
the Fifth Amendment barred “compelled” statements. Although
88
the current Court often treats these terms as interchangeable,
they have very different meanings under the law of confessions.
As Professor Kamisar explains:
When we talk about a “coerced” or “involuntary” confession,
we mean a confession that is inadmissible under the preMiranda due process/totality of circumstances test because, as
the courts usually put it when they apply such a test, taking
into account the totality of circumstances, the confession was
not a “product of free choice” or “free will” but one where
the defendant’s will was “overborne” or “broken.” More oppressive methods were needed to render a confession “coerced” or “involuntary” under the pre-Miranda test for the
admissibility of confessions than are necessary to make a confession “compelled” within the meaning of the selfmade the privilege the principal basis for constitutional limitations on police interrogation practices.” David Dolinko, Is There a Rationale for the Privilege Against SelfIncrimination?, 33 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1063, 1064 (1986).
86. Stephen J. Schulhofer, Miranda, Dickerson, and the Puzzling Persistence Of
Fifth Amendment Exceptionalism, 99 MICH. L. REV. 941, 949 (2001) [hereinafter, Schulhofer, Fifth Amendment Exceptionalism]. Professor Schulhofer also notes that “no member of the Court, Justices Scalia and Thomas included, shows any inclination” to disincorporate the privilege. Id. See also GRANO, supra note 42, at 122–23 (responding to
Dripps’ earlier proposal to disincorporate the privilege, noting that such a proposal “is
likely to be perceived as too radical, or too late in the day, to garner majority support on
the Court”). Justice Scalia, however, has questioned the historical pedigree and logic of
Griffin, and Justice Thomas has stated that “Griffin and its progeny . . . should be reexamined.” Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 332 (1999) (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at
341–42 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
87. Schulhofer, Fifth Amendment Exceptionalism, supra note 86, at 950.
88. Letter from Professor Yale Kamisar to Tracey Maclin, May 4, 2005 (on file with
author).
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incrimination clause. That, at least, is the premise of Miranda.
And that, at least, appears to have been the understanding of
89
everyone involved in the case.

Miranda, of course, significantly changed the constitutional
calculus by bringing the privilege into the stationhouse. Miranda
meant greater protection for suspects facing custodial interrogation because, as Professor Schulhofer explains, the “Fifth
Amendment itself sweeps more broadly than the due process rule
90
against involuntary statements.” And, as Schulhofer goes on to
note, the Fifth Amendment protects against the use of a compelled statement “even when the compelled statement is not in91
voluntary within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.”
If adopted by the courts, Dripps’ instrumental due process
model will most likely result in a return to the involuntarinesstotality of the circumstances test that existed pre-Miranda, albeit
with the presence of counsel at judicially supervised interrogation sessions. Although never expressly stated, Dripps must believe that if his proposal was adopted, a few lawyers would advise their clients to speak with the police during a pre-trial
interrogation session. And in order to secure the continued participation of police and prosecutorial officials, a certain amount
of aggressive and/or deceptive questioning would have to be
permitted. Certainly law enforcement officials would not continue participating in an investigative procedure dominated by
defense counsel or one in which their questions were met with a
refusal to respond. Otherwise, why would law enforcement officials participate? Under Dripps’ proposal, however, the Fifth
Amendment would no longer be the benchmark for judging the
constitutional validity of statements and evidence obtained during a pre-trial interrogation session. The admissibility of any
statement or evidence would be measured by the due process
clause.
In sum, from the perspective of the accused, Miranda is no
panacea. But Miranda affords significantly more protection than

89. Id. See also Schulhofer, Fifth Amendment Exceptionalism, supra note 86, at 950
(“Starting with [Michigan v.] Tucker, [417 U.S. 433 (1974)], the Court took the teeth out
of incorporation by asserting that compulsion meant nothing different from involuntariness after all. If valid, that claim leaves one to wonder what all the fuss was about in
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) and why Justices Harlan and Clark so passionately
argued, in dissent, that only Fourteenth Amendment involuntariness, not freedom from
Fifth Amendment compulsion, should be required of the states.”).
90. Schulhofer, Fifth Amendment Exceptionalism, supra note 86, at 946.
91. Id.
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that provided by the Due Process Clause. If the Fifth Amendment privilege no longer applied to state officials, and police interrogation was judged by an instrumental due process model,
criminal defendants would have less protection than they have
today. True, defense counsel would be available at the moment
of arrest. But counsel would face the Catch-22 of letting her client talk with the police, or endure an adverse inference at trial.
Under such a regime, the right to silence would mean very little,
if anything. The admissibility of statements or evidence obtained
pursuant to custodial interrogation would be determined by due
process standards. If the reasoning and result in Colorado v.
Connelly is an indication of how the Court would apply due
process norms, then someone like Dripps, who is concerned with
the reliability of confessions, is not likely to be pleased with the
92
Court’s application of instrumental due process.
92. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986), held, inter alia, that the Due Process
Clause does not require the suppression of a confession given by a person who suffered
from chronic schizophrenia, “command hallucinations,” and was in a psychotic state at
the time he made his confession. Connelly explained that “[a]bsent police conduct causally related to the confession, there is simply no basis for concluding that any state actor
has deprived a criminal defendant of due process of law.” The Court conceded that Connelly’s confession might be “quite unreliable,” but explained that reliability is a matter of
state evidentiary laws, and not a concern of the Due Process Clause. 479 U.S. at 164.
Connelly reveals the type of results conservative Justices are willing to tolerate.
Suppression of incriminating evidence should be avoided at all costs, even if it means the
admission of unreliable evidence. As Professor Laurence Benner has perceptively explained:
[S]urely this is the (exclusionary) tail wagging the (due process) dog, for the upshot of the Court’s position is that unless exclusion will deter someone in an official capacity, there can be no due process violation no matter how unjust the
result. By allowing the deterrence rationale for the exclusionary rule to control
the nature of the due process inquiry, the Court thus permits the logic of deterrence to shape the actual content of due process itself. Under this formula any
concern for justice is excluded from the equation. Indeed, any attempt to develop a coherent theory of justice under the due process clause is precluded.
Laurence Benner, Requiem for Miranda: The Rehnquist Court’s Voluntariness Doctrine
in Historical Perspective, 67 WASH. U. L. Q. 59, 136–37 (1989).
The two most recent Miranda rulings from the Court, decided after Dripps’ book
was published, United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630 (2004) and Missouri v. Seibert, 542
U.S. 600 (2004), will also give cold comfort to those who think a due process regime, applied by conservative Justices, will be a better method to regulate police misconduct. In
Patane, a plurality held that a failure to provide Miranda warnings does not require the
suppression of the physical fruits of the suspect’s unwarned but voluntary statements.
Seibert ruled that when police deliberately fail to give Miranda warnings at the outset of
interrogation, obtain an incriminating statement, and then later give the warnings, a
“second” statement from the suspect, which is essential a replay of the earlier statement,
is inadmissible. While space limitations preclude a full critique of Patane and Seibert, it is
sufficient to note the following: “The obvious danger of Patane is that the Court created
a new incentive for police officers to violate Miranda. After Patane, rational police officers will ignore Miranda whenever the large and immediate benefits of obtaining in-
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CONCLUSION
Professor Dripps closes his book expressing the hope that
his book has provided his readers with something to think about.
Dripps quotes H.L.A. Hart: “Of [Jeremy] Bentham, Hart wrote
that even where he ‘fails to persuade, he still forces us to think.’
If I have achieved this much, this study will have succeeded be93
yond my fondest hopes” (p. 189). After giving his book two
careful readings, I can say without hesitation that Dripps has
successfully accomplished that mission. Dripps’ book is essential
reading for anyone interested in constitutional criminal procedure. Whatever one’s political persuasion, reading Dripps’ book
will force them to think anew about how the Supreme Court
constructs constitutional criminal procedure.

criminating physical evidence outweigh the possible harm to some future prosecutor of
exclusion of a statement (but not the physical evidence) in the unlikely event that the
case goes to trial.” Joelle Anne Moreno, Faith-Based Miranda?: Why The New Missouri
v. Seibert Police “Bad Faith” Test is a Terrible Idea, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 395, 395–96 (2005).
Nor will Seibert, in the long run, act as a restrain on deliberate misconduct during police
interrogations. Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Seibert, which provided the fifth vote in
that case, made plain that he would have admitted Seibert’s second confession had the
police undertaken certain “curative measures.” 542 U.S. at 622 (Kennedy, J., concurring
in the judgment). There is no hint in either Patane or Seibert that the defendants’ statements would have been deemed “involuntary” for purposes of due process. In fact, the
Patane plurality repeatedly emphasized that Patane’s statement was “voluntary,” and
Justice Souter’s opinion for the Court in Seibert specifically left unaddressed “the actual
voluntariness” of Seibert’s second statement. 542 U.S. at 617 n.8. For an excellent critique of Patane and Seibert, see Yale Kamisar, Postscript: Another Look at Patane and
Seibert, the 2004 Miranda “Poisoned Fruit” Cases, 2 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 97 (2004).
93. Quoting H.L.A. HART, ESSAYS ON BENTHAM: JURISPRUDENCE AND
POLITICAL THEORY 39 (1982).

